Ethical or Legal – Outsourcing Legal services – Kazim Ma Foi

Benjamin H Brewster once said “lawyer starts life giving $500 worth of law for $5, and ends giving $5 worth for $500”.

Interestingly, F W Taylor father of scientific management would have referred the above condition as misalignment of labor, task and rewards system. A close look would have a few similes between what is called as principles of scientific management and the purpose of outsourcing since both concepts promote division of work (specialization), de-skilling of worker and dehumanization of workplace that are key for process excellence in business.

Most of us know that virtues of outsourcing are well recognized in the information age today be it about exploiting location advantages, gaining excellence, fostering innovation, accessing new markets and so on. Corporations as we recognize in the process of multiplying value to shareholder’s wealth, are some ways demonizing the philosophy of “doing-all-of-it-by-own”, in stepping up targeted growth engines. Partnerships are sought off shores, new geographies are explored, business models are tested and talents are accessed to create significant impact on endearing value creation for stakeholders.

The subject of outsourcing however, is no new to us and in the context of India’s growth story it is just a remarkable celebration. Thanks to the growth India has experienced in ICT, Financial services, R&D etc., in the last decade to become undoubtedly the best destinations for outsourcing work in the world.

Legal process outsourcing (famously known as LPO) is today yet another high tide in the raging seas of outsourcing that carries enough currents with it to sweep away the basic nature of law as a practice and delivery of legal services worldwide. Client’s expectations and needs of quantum quality in service delivery appear to have diametrically stretched business processes and hence rewriting new corollary in client relationship management. Those who are witness to these underlying movements will ascertain that law as a practice seesaws in its content, scope and criticality particularly when legal/non legal work in the guise of cost, quality and other strategic advantages are shipping out to different destinations.  On the other hand, the visible fear of losing control of the process, shrinking job profile and risking quality of service are concerns that thwart attorneys and law firms in the US  and UK from outsourcing work to nations like India.

Recognizing these imperatives the bar associations for instance of Florida, Los Angeles County, New York City, North Carolina and San Diego County, which are few significant jurisdictions have framework of rules and views with ethical and practical considerations. It is noteworthy to understand that the rules of ethics and professional responsibility are conventionally delegated by the courts to the state bar associations. The proposed considerations by any state bar are enforceable by the state court in that particular state but in absence of applicable statutes, the courts then will look up to bar associations be it local or national for necessary help.

The American Bar Association (popularly known as ABA) the largest voluntary professional membership organization in the world takes practical view of professional obligations and industry imperatives from time to time. Although the ABA Ethics Committee opinions are non-binding, yet they do serve as an important guide and provide yardsticks to address issues if any.

The landmark opinion was issued last year by the Ethics Committee of the ABA and terms like jurisdiction, competent representation, layperson, client confidentiality, client consent, supervision of non-lawyers, avoid aiding non-lawyers in the unauthorized practices of law, commodity work and so on, which have seen various interpretations are dealt under a set of considerations proposed by ABA.

The following few are some of the clarifications summarized which therefore act as building blocks in the process of outsourcing legal work:

1. Responsibility: Lawyer may outsource legal or non-legal support services provided the lawyer eventually responsible for providing competent legal services to the client since lawyers also engage various parties (including both non-lawyers and lawyers) in servicing clients
2. Diligence: Ensuring conduct of the service provider is compatible with professional obligations particularly for a distant offshore location.  Important considerations are reference checks/background investigations of lawyer or non-lawyer providers/intermediaries and if required conduct interview, education background vet, site visits etc
3. Client Consent: Written confidentiality is advised however depending on the level of supervision contemplated by the outsourcing lawyer, obtaining informed client consent before engaging outside (offshore or onshore) assistance may be necessary
4. Fees: Reasonability of the fees is necessary.  Permission to pass along to the client the costs of using service provider, including reasonable allocation of associated overhead expenses, but without any mark up in any ways
5. Equality: No distinction between onshore outsourcing and offshore outsourcing, with the exception of the level of diligence performed and background checking
6. Offshore Regulatory Systems: Comparability of the legal education system with that of the U.S., professional regulatory systems incorporate equivalent core ethics principles and effective disciplinary enforcement systems. In addition, legal system protects or sustains client confidentiality and provides effective remedies to the lawyer’s client for disputes rising if any
7. Practicing of Law:  Each of the local bar association opinions addresses this issue, and concludes that the outsourcing of legal services, either offshore or onshore, does not constitute the unauthorized practice of law since the ABA Ethics Committee noted that it lacks authority to express an opinion regarding whether any particular service provider is engaging in unauthorized practice of law
8. Endorsement: Outsourcing is good for the health of the profession itself
9. Catalysts:  ABA is instrumental in necessarily setting forth clear guidelines has immensely helped in making Lawyers and Attorneys in the U.S., to pursue outsourcing for significant advantages

All such moves and considerations appear to bring about paradigm shifts in the business landscape of legal process outsourcing.  The larger question remains to be answered is whether outsourcing means for a professional lawyer in the US to decide handing over either his court, the case brief or the client relationship to the Indian legal professional?

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OWNERSHIP AND ASSIGNMENT OF COPYRIGHTS

OWNERSHIP AND ASSIGNMENT OF COPYRIGHT

INTRODUCTION

Copyright protection is given for  a work having originality,ie it should be from the author and must have minimum degree of  creativity. So it is the author who is the real creator of the work thereby  first owner of the copyright and Indian law recognizes author as the first owner of the copyright [1].But by the term ‘ownership’ it means it includes not only the author ,but also assignee and can even a legal entity even though not defined in the Act. In Bern convention the term Author is not defined, instead it says the person  under whose name the work is disclosed ,which implies that it is not necessary that always the author should be the owner.[2] However Indian copyright Act defines the tern ‘Author’with respect to various works, but still leaves some problems. It becomes more complex in the context of changing technologies,ie cinematographic works, sound recording ,broadcasting etc which is a combination of different works, also when author does the work in the course of employment. When new technologies emerge, different mode of communication simultaneously arise and the exploitation of the copyright  by way of  assignment &licensing will add economic benefits to the copyright owner and the provisions of assignment and licensing becomes crucial. By amendments Indian Copyright Act has taken care of such provisions, but still leaving  lacunae & the role of judiciary becomes crucial in interpreting such provisions for effectively protecting the rights of the authors.

The attempt through this paper is to analyze the provisions relating to the ownership and assignment of copyright and in the context of changing mode of communication technologies  how it tackled the problems emerged in ownership, assignment and license of copyright, the adequacy of these provisions in effectively  protecting  the rights of the  author & tries to balance the rights of the owner  of copyright vis-à-vis public interest. Also  the role of judiciary in effectively protecting their rights.

 Ownership of copyright

The  owner of the copyright means person who possess and enjoys the legal right.The definition given to the author in the context of copyright protection depends on the nature of the work  & s.2(d ) [3]defines ‘author’.The creator of the work can also be joint authors,but dilemma lies in determining the criteria for joint authorship, S. 2(z) of the Copyright Act defines work of joint authorship[4].Such an issue came before the court in Najma Heptulla v.Orient longman Ltd.[5]the question before the Court was whether a person who gives form to the narration will become the joint author of the book India Wins freedom’. Eventhough the  work was composed by the Kabir the material for the book was supplied by the Azad with a clear understanding that kabir will describe those thoughts & conversations and write the same in English language and Kabir’s function  was only to record Azad’s findings and not to let his views colour the narrative . The preface itself shows It is the Azad who decided as to which 30 pages of the book were not to be publish and which of his views should be contain in his book and read every word of manuscript and made alterations additions, omissions and correction.

But the finding of the Court was  Azad and Kabir are the joint authors of the work and Kabir was more than a mere scribe of thoughts of Azad. Since both of them actively and intellectually collaborated in the composition of literal work. However no specific criteria was laid down by the court to determine what amount to active and close intellectual collaboration to determine join authorship. It raises an interesting question whether a person who has not himself put pen to paper but someone else has done that effectively writing what the first person had created can become a joint author. Or mere recording a narration makes him a joint author.  However, after this case no such issue has came before the judiciary.

In U.S. the condition to satisfy joint authorship has to prove (a) in what part of expression of the work he significantly and substantially collaborated and that it originated from him. (b)contribution must be original expression to the work (c) contribution of the joint author to the work need not be equal but has to be substantial or significant  (d) what constitute significant and substantial contribution involves his contribution to original expression, qualitatively and quantitatively, either equally or significantly or substantially pursuant to a common goal.

In Hardly v. Kemp[6] in the context of pop group one member devised the song and the group as whole performed them held members of the group were not joint authors. Contributions need to be creation of musical work not to the performance or interpretation of them here, however significant and skillful their contribution to the performance of  musical work are not right kind of contribution to give them sharing copy rights. Also the contributing to authoring of the software was like a proof reader skill not authorship skill[7].

Another  kind of complexity lies when the work is a combination of different works eg cinematographic works, sound recordings etc & the lack of clarity in the definition of “producer” adds to it [8]Such a question came before the court in GeePee Films(p) ltd. Vs. Pratik Chowdhary,[9]  the question before the court was  by taking the financial responsibility of sound recording whether one will fall under the definition of ‘producer’. Even though the plaintiff paid all the expenses of recording  including hire charges of studio and remuneration of musicians   it will not amount to taking responsibility of such recording and thus cannot be held to be a producer, since the ‘responsibility’ appearing in sec 2(uu) does nor refer to financial responsibility but “consequential legal liability” for such recording.

Also to decide the ownership of copyright when the author does the work at the instance of  any person for valuable consideration, or in the case of the course of employment under contract of service [10]  faces some complexity and what amounts to contact of service also depends on facts of each case & judiciary has laid down different tests to determine it. An author may create a work independently, or he may create a work under a contract of service or contract for service

One of such instance that came before the court was in  V.T Thomas v. Malayala Manorama,[11]  where the question before the court was after termination of employment  of employee(Tom) from Manorama regarding the future work of Tom manorama  can claim authorship it was held that in the case of termination of the employment, the employee is entitled to the ownership of copyright in the works created subsequently and the former employer has no copyright over the subsequent work so created. . After his termination of employment from Manorama  Tom is the author of the work he is free to draw the cartoons and Manorama has no right to restrain him from drawing the cartoon.. Here the interesting question is that if the Manorama contented that they are the owner of the cartoons then  is it possible for them to restrain Tom to use such characters. If the cartoon is developed during the course of employment whether the author can use it after his termination from employment. It seems rather than giving clear reasoning to the legal questions arised the court allowed both parties to continue the publication of the cartoons. Concluding that cartoon characters were developed by the author in 1957 which entitle him to copyrights.

In determining whether  a person is engaged in a contract of service or contract for service fundamental test to be  applied is “whether a person who has engaged himself to perform these services is performing them as a person in business on his own account” If the answer is yes then it is contract for service or whether  the employee employed is part of business and his work is integral part of the business, or whether his work is not integrated into the business but is only accessory to it or the work done by him in business on his own account. In the former case it is a contract of service and in the latter a contract for service. [12]

A different  test was  considered  and laid down by the court in Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd v. Gajendra Singh and ors [13]Here the plaintiff  (Zee TV) alleged that the defendents (star TV) employee was  in contract of service with the plaintiff from 1992-1997 and created a concept note  of Anthakshari & during the course of his employment with the Plaintiff, Defendant No. 1 in consultation with other senior employees and the Plaintiff’s programming team originated the format of a television game show titled `Antakshari’ and reduced the same to writing in the form of a concept note,hence the employer is the owner of the copyright.The  question before the court was whether the defendant was in contract of service or contract for service. After  going through the the  employment agreement of 1994 find some clauses indicates contract of service and some clauses was in favour of contract for service .Taking in to consideration of  the facts that the signing of the voucher by the defendants on behalf of the the plaintiff to make payments, TDS certificate indicates  him as contractor, Regarding  letters send to defendants by the plaintiff appointing as a chairman ,seeking his career progress, Gross salary package revised, usually. the word salary never used etc held as   contract of service.

In University of London Press v. University Tutorial Press,[14] the examiner was free to prepare his questions at his convenience so long as they were ready by the appointment for the examinations, and it was left to his skill the syllabus, the book work, and the standard of knowledge to be expected at the matriculation examination, and in view of this aspect of matter, the examiner was not acting under the contract of service but contract for service.

Where a man employs another to do work for him under his control, so that he can direct the time when the work shall be done the means to be adopted to bring about the end, and the method in which the work shall be arrived on, then the contract is contract of service, copyright vest in the employer. If, on the other hand, a man employs another to do certain work but leaves it to that other to decide how that work shall be done. What step shall be taken to produce that desired effect, and then it is a contract for service. In such cases a copyright vests in him and not the employer. Control test is a useful way of determining whether a person is an employee where the parties are in master -servant relationship.[15] But it provides little help in relation to those professions where a person has considerable amount of freedom. In the circumstances the courts have stressed that the question of whether some one is an employee depends on whether the work they perform is an integral part of the business. In determining whether someone is an employee, court, looks at nature of relationship and what is that and what it is that a person does in day to day activities. Also factors like their responsibility provide their own equipment, hire their own helpers, take financial risk and have opportunity of profiting from the task they perform. Also financial arrangement between the parties etc.

The modern approach has been to abandon the search for a single test, and instead to take a multiple or ‘ pragmatic ‘ approach, weighing upon all the factors for and against a contract of employment and determining on which side the scales eventually settle. Factors which are usually of importance are as follows – the power to select and dismiss, the direct payment of some form of remuneration, deduction of PAYE and national insurance contributions, the organisation of the workplace, the supply of tools and materials (though there can still be a labour-only sub- contract) and the economic realities (in particular who bears the risk of loss and has the chance of profit and whether the employee could be said to be ‘in business on his own account’). A further development in the recent case-law (particularly concerning atypical employments) has been the idea of mutuality of obligations ‘ as a possible factor i.e. whether the course of dealings between the parties demonstrates sufficient such mutuality for there to be an overall employment relationship

In IPRS Vs. Eastern India Motion Pictures,[16]  The question before the court was whether the producer of a cinematography film can defeat the rights of composer of music or lyrist and the court held that u/s17(b) there is automatic transfer of all rights of the author.  Therefore, the producer is the owner of musical or sound recording the producer can defeat right of the composer of music or lyrist .But Sec 13(4) says that copy right in a cinematographic film or a sound recording shall not affect the separate copyright in any work in respect of it or a substantial part of which, the film, or, as the case may be, the sound recording is made, so by the combined reading of sec. 13(3) and (4) presupposes contractual relationship with these creators to safeguard the interest S.17 contemplates  contract of employment and in the case of 17(b) cinematography film can be made under contract for employment in such cases copyright of composers and lyrists still remains with them. It is the contractual obligation which binds the producers and composers and lyrists   , and 17(b) there is no automatic transfer of all rights of the author. In 17(b) there is no mention of the sound recording or literary or musical work only cinematographic film is mentioned.  Therefore, the producer is not the owner of musical or sound recording unless it complies with S.17(c) thus the producer cannot defeat right of the composer of music or lyrist. So it is clear that intention behind S.17(b) is to provide incentive to the author of  literary or musical or sound recording work otherwise the whole purpose of sec. 17 and 13(4) which safeguards the balance will be defeated. But here the court give different interpretation to 17(b) without considering S 13(4) and (5) and held that there is automatic transfer of all rights of authors u/s.17(b) .By this decision, it will be the producer who will be enjoying economic benefits from the work of composer or lyrist. The producer is getting the right to incorporate literary or musical work in the cinematographic film. So once the literary or musical work of the composer or lyrist is incorporated in cinematographic film i.e., right u/s. 14(a)(iv) is transferred to the producer but the other rights of author on musical and literal work still rest upon composer or lyrist.To an extent it was made clear by later  amendments in s. 2(g) &(uu)also s.14.

In the case of Govt. work Govt shall be the first owner of the copyright in the absence of agreement to the contrary,  In BM Piros Vs. State of Kerala[17] the Govt. (defendant) as part of information technology implementation in Govt. department a software development project was entrusted to CDIT they in turn entrusted the work to plaintiff. On completion of the work plaintiff filed a suit claiming to be owner of the program. So it was  held that work was a government work and hence defendants (State of Kerala) was the author of the work. U/s 17(d) which states that in the case of Govt. work Govt shall be the first owner of the copyright in the absence of agreement to the contrary, here there was no agreement to contrary.

Transfer of Copyright

One of the rights of the copyright owner is the right to transfer his rights u/s,14 of the copyright Act either wholly or partially by assignment or license, even exclusive license. In the case of tangible property by assignment of his property he loses his rights over it but in the case of IP even after its assignment the owner can still enjoy the property depending upon the right assigned. This major difference is due to the nature of intellectual property from other property. In the case of copyright the transfer of right depends upon diverse nature of IP.  Even though there is exclusiveness in the copyright but copyright owner cannot exclude independent creators of work.  It is only expression that is protected not the idea is based on its implication in public interest.

Assignment and License of copyright

Change of concept of indivisibility to licensing of copyright is due to changing technologies and tremendous advancement in the field of communication technology. One of the characteristics of the copyright is that it has the potential to be used by a range of different users at the same time.   For example, a sound recording can be played in numerous public places simultaneously. As works are increasingly exploited in this manner, the role of licensing in exploitation becomes ever more important. It enables copyright to be transferred to those who can exploit it most profitably. And the terms of the transfer agreement will determine how the profits are to be distributed. The Indian copyright recognizes two types of transfer of IP i.e., license and assignments, it always depends upon nature of property transferred. Depending upon the nature of monopoly created by IP and its implication on public interest has created problems in respect of licensing and assignment. The terms and conditions incorporated in the agreement determines whether the party intended is assignment or license ie from the intention of the parties[18]. The word “devolves upon” is a term similar to assignment[19]. But sometimes  the court finds it extremely difficult to distinguish the exclusive license and partial assignment, if the agreement contain express words or terms like the copyright vest on the owner or ,liability to revise the book vest on the owner or  not to edit similar kinds of work or  if the demand of the work has ceased the agreement was considered as terminated it is an assignment. Where the agreements contain no such terms ,but the consideration is the payment of royalties or a share of profits instead of downright payment then the copyright is not assigned it would be an exclusive license to sell. So if the payment is by way of royalty  or some other way then it is a license such interpretation is quite absurd[20]. If  there is a usual term of payment of certain percentage of royalty to the owner of the copyright or by a share in profits instead of a sum of money paid down, the inference is that copyright is not assigned, but sole and exclusive license is concerned upon the publisher [21]This kind of wrong interpretation assumed by the court in deciding the agreement is a license or assignment by taking in to account of the nature of consideration paid  is what later followed in  KPM Sundarams case.What the court has to look into is the real intention of the parties, if  the terms are expressed clearly then to follow plain interpretation. It was nature of the agreement which decides the nature of property transferred.

Difference Between  Assignment and License

Assignment of copy right and copyright license are two forms of contract involved in the exploitation of copyright work by a third party. Each has its own distinct characteristics. A license is an authorization of an act without which authorization would be an infringement. Licensing usually involves licensing of some of the rights and not the whole. Licenses can be exclusive or non exclusive.  An assignment involves the disposal of the copyright: the author (assigner) assigns the copyright to another person (assignee) or transfer of ownership of the copyright[22].In the case of license only specified interest in IP is transferred not the ownership is transferred to the licensee. A license normally does not confer any right to licensee against licensor or third party but exclusive licensee [23]has substantial rights against the licensor , even to sue the licensor. And by s.30 if the licensee in the case of future work dies before the work comes in to existence his legal representatives shall be entitled to such works, in the absence of any provision to the contrary.

Unless he joints the owner of copyrights as a party to the infringement action, he can not take an action for infringement against third party [24]but a purchaser in good faith and for value of the proprietors interest without notice of previous licensee is unaffected by it.[25] The licensee can however, sue the assignor for damages for breach of contract if the latter does not protect his interest. A licensee has a right to make alterations except in so far as his license expressly or impliedly restricts the right. A failure to pay royalties enables the licensor to revoke the license. But in the case of assignment it is not possible[26].. But if  there is any harsh terms which affect the author can lead to revocation if a complaint is made to the copyright Board. Where the assignee of a copyright becomes entitled to any right comprised in the copyright, the assignee as respects  to the rights so assigned, and the assignor as respects the rights not assigned, shall be treated for the purposes of this Act as the owner of copyright and the provisions of this Act shall have effect accordingly. The expression “assignee” as respects the assignment of the copyright in any future work includes the legal representatives of the assignee, if the assignee dies before the work comes into existence. The owner of the copyright has the power to assign his entire rights or assign only some of the rights. In case the rights are split up there is only partial assignment. Assignee will be the owner of the copyright as regard rights so assigned, the owner will be the owner of the copyright of remaining rights. The assignment could be for whole duration of the copyright or for a short duration.

Mode of assignment

No assignment of the copyright in any work shall be valid unless it is in writing signed by the assignor or by his duly authorized agent. It shall identify such work, specify the rights assigned, duration, territorial extent   of such assignment, amount of royalty payable to the author. If the period is not stated it shall be deemed to be five years  and territorial extend  shall be presumed to extend  within India. If the assignee does not exercise such rights within one year from the date of such assignment it shall be deemed to have lapsed unless otherwise specified in the assignment.[27] The assignor can file a complaint to the copyright board  if the assignee fails to make sufficient exercise  of the rights assigned, failure not attributable to the act or omission, then copyright. board after such enquiry  as it deem necessary may revoke the assignment, this provision may be used for u/s 31 as a ground for compulsory licensing. Also regarding any dispute to assignment it follows the same procedure   including an order for recovery  of any royalty payable. Provided that if the terms   of the assignment is harsh to the assignor(author) it shall revoke the assignment, but after five years  from the date of assignment. This proviso seems to be irrational, it may not help the author to revoke within five years which means he has to suffer.  s.19 & 19A are applicable in the of licensing too. . In the case of unpublished work the author must be a citizen of India or domiciled in India at the time of the creation of the work. Copyright in an architectural work will subsist only if the work is located in India irrespective of the nationality of the author.

Assignment of Future Rights

The owner of the copyright in an existing work or the prospective owner of the copyright in a future work may assign to any person the copyright, either wholly or partially and either generally or subject to limitations and either for the whole term of the copyright or any part thereof. However, in the case of the assignment of copyright in any future work, the assignment shall take effect only when the work comes into existence.  when  new rights are granted  by the legislature on existing works due to the technological development, problem arises as to the ownership of the new rights,whether the assignor who assigned already all the existing rights on the work or the assignee is the owner of the future rights.

This question came before the court in Raj video vision v. K. Mohanakrishnan, [28]here the defendant (producer) assigned all negative rights to Azam and Co. and they transferred to defendant (D2) in 1961. But in 1988 D1 entered into agreement with plaintiff and assigned video right of film ‘Pasamalar’ and it exploitation, distribution and exhibition in India and Srilanka. In 1989 D2 restrained plaintiff claiming that they have entire copy right in film ‘Pasamalar’ and they have not assigned the video rights to anyone. So the plaintiff filed a suit to declare his rights as in agreements and restrained defendant from interfering with his video rights. After going through the agreement the court held that as per section 14(1)(ii) and Sec.2(d)(v)of copyright at the producer as the original owner had the said right on the date of assignment in favour of plaintiff and when the producers themselves were not aware of their future rights accrued due to scientific advancement, it cannot be said that they have already transferred the rights not in existence by way of assignment.  the D2 can not claim a right  which was not contemplated at the time of original assignment in the year 1961.But in Maganlal Savany Vs. Rupam Pictures [29]here the plaintiff was given wide rights of exploitation of the film’ Chupke Chupke’ by the producer  that is “the assignor here by agrees and undertake that the said picture shall not be exploited or distributed or exhibited commercially, non commercially or in any other manner what so ever in the contracted territory “ D1 (Producer) assigned satellite rights to the third party, which was not contemplated at the time of assignment to the plaintiff. The plaintiff wants to restraint the defendants by injunction. Here the court held that the term exploitation has to be given a wider meaning that is exploitation of a film takes in all the scientific and technological device that may be invented in future also and plaintiff could make use of those inventions.  Given such an interpretation of word exploitation satellite telecasting of the picture ‘Chupke Chupke’ will per se be violative of the provisions of the agreement  to the plaintiff.

Thus from the above two cases it could be seen that a very wide interpretation was given to the term exploitation in Maganlal’s case which is against the interpretations given in Raj video visions case. It seems that it is the nature of terms used in the agreements which made the judge to give such wide interpretation but the concern is that such interpretations will affect the rights of the producers who is the real owner of the works. In the event of new technological advancement new rights emerging from it which was not contemplated at the times of assignment, must vest upon the producer. Otherwise, it will be someone who will be enjoying the economic benefits emerging out of it. So the plight of the producer has to be considered by the judiciary while giving such interpretations.

Re-sale Share Right

The first owner of the copyright and his legal heirs are granted a right called resale share right in original copy. This right is exercisable even after the assignment of the work. This right is confined to certain works only i.e., original copy of painting, sculpture, or drawing or original manuscript of a literary or dramatic or musical work and is available only to the first owner of right or his legal heirs.[30] This right is conferred by S.53A the share shall be fixed by copyright Board. Different shares for different classes of work, share shall not exceed 10% of re sale price. The decision of the copyright Board shall be final if any dispute arises.

Right of author to relinquish copyright

The author of a work may relinquish all or any of the rights comprised in the copyright in the work by giving notice in the prescribed from to the Registrar of Copyrights and thereupon such rights shall, subject to the following conditions, cease to exist from the date of the notice. On receipt of a notice, the Registrar of Copyrights shall cause it to be published in the Official Gazette and in such other manner as he may deem fit.[31] The relinquishment of all or any of the rights comprised in the copyright in a work shall not affect any rights subsisting in favour of any person on the date of the notice.

Conclusion-

As the Indian copyright law tries to accommodate new changes ie challenges set by electronic information network and to be in tune with the international agreements ie controls to assure equitable or proportional remuneration to authors. ,it is ultimately  in the hands of the judiciary how effectively it protects the rights of the  authors especially in the case of cinematographic works & tries to balance the rights of the owner  of copyright vis-à-vis public interest, also in   interpreting the provisions of ownership, assignment and license of copyright   and in laying down the criteria for effectively protecting the author’s   rights in the course of employment. When new technologies emerge, different mode of communication simultaneously arise and the exploitation of the copyright  by way of licensing will add economic benefits to the copyright owner and the judiciary must be cautious while making interpretion,since it may have drastic economic impact on the actual owner of the work. If the law increases the range of individuals who can claim copyright and the territories in which they can claim, the task of securing all the necessary licenses become intolerably burdensome,eg  satellite broad cast licenses.  Such context gains importance of copyright law to set minimum standards  to protect individual creators  against the superior bargaining knowledge, skill and sheer powers of entrepreneurs.

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Penal Provisions under HVAT Act, 2003.

The word Penalty can be defined to mean a pecuniary punishment for any breach of law, rule or contract, any sum named in a bond as the amount to be forfeited by the obligor in case he does not comply with the condition of the bond, money recoverable by virtue of a penal statute, sum agreed to be paid on breach of an agreement or some stipulation in it. This is in short a meaning of penalty. Almost in all commercial laws, there is provision for imposition of penalty for defaults and breaches.
The doctrine of mens rea, biasness, malafide, subjective or objective mind, non-adherence of principles of natural justice, pecuniary and personal biasness, abuse of discretionary powers, satisfaction are few important and key matters which play a vital and important role in the levy of penalty. Penalty itself is a very wide subject when looked from the point of general principles of penalty and it is not my today’s subject.

I will confine myself only to the penal provisions contained in the Haryana VAT Act, 2003.

Consequent upon the introduction of VAT in the State of Haryana, the Legislature has attempted to curtail the discretionary powers of the Assessing Authorities with regard the quantum of penalty, compounding penalties with interest and prescribing minimum or maximum penalties. This has, perhaps, been done to leave much little for the enforcing authorities. Undoubtedly, in majority of the cases, the authorities tend to be subjective rather than to be objective while dealing with penal provisions. Yet, curtailing the discretionary powers means injury to few bona fide cases, where the dealers are prevented for sufficient cause to comply with the provisions of the Act. This surely is resulting into greater hardship to such dealers but the objective of the legislature could be different. In their wisdom, the Legislature decides what is good for the welfare of the State.

1 Penalty for failure to use goods for the purpose purchased – sub-section (5) of section 7 of the HVAT Act

According to the provisions of sub-section (5) of section 7 of the HVAT Act, if an “Authorized dealer” after purchasing any goods for any of the purposes specified in clause (a), (b) or clause (c) of sub-section 4 of s. 7 of the Act, fails to make use of the goods for any such purpose, without reasonable excuse, the Assessing Authority, may impose upon him a penalty not exceeding one and half times the tax which would have been levied additionally . The goods have been specified as goods used –

a) in the manufacture of goods for sale;

b) in the telecommunication network;

c) in mining; or

d) generation or distribution of electricity or any other form of power; and

e) packing materials specified in the certificate of registration,

Exception to this rule is that penal action would not be taken if the dealer voluntarily deposits the differential tax along with his returns.

The word “Authorized dealer” has not been defined either under the HVAT Act or Rules and the legislature has not used the words like dealer or registered dealer meaning thereby that such dealer not necessarily to be registered but must be competent to purchase such goods at the concessional rate of tax. It is expected that all manufacturer- dealers should submit a comprehensive list of items while obtaining registration certificates so as to cover their required items.

In this sub-section, the term “may” has been used meaning thereby that it is left to the Assessing Authority to impose or waive the penalty considering the explanation rendered by the assessee for his failure to use the goods for specified purpose. The satisfaction of the A.A. has essentially to be there. Needless to say that penal provision would apply only where the goods have been purchased at the concessional rate of tax against the specified declaration.

If a dealer uses his declaration to purchase goods at concessional rate of tax and partly uses the goods for the specified purpose i.e. manufacture of goods for sale and further sells some of the goods to other dealers at a concessional rate owing to non-use of goods, the Court held the penalty was lawful for misuse of declaration by the dealer. Bharjatiya Steel Vs. CST (2008) 13 VST 514 (SC).

Once a seller receives a completed declaration form against concessional sales, the selling dealer is not liable for ensuring the proper use of goods sold. It means if a dealer has sold certain goods to a manufacturer-dealer against proper declaration form, the selling dealer is not expected to keep track on manner in which goods have been used. Aditya Envirotech Pvt Ltd. Vs. CTO (2008) 16 VST 145 (MAD).

Where the dealer purchased formaldehyde for use in the synthetic resin against prescribed declaration and used the same in the manufacture of such resin. However, the sale of synthetic resin as goods not covered under any Schedule. Such action does not amount to failure to use goods for declared purpose attracting penalty for misuse of declaration, State of Karnatka Vs Ganpathy Ram (1992) 87-STC-329 (Kar).

Where an item is specified in the R.C of a dealer for the purpose u/s section 5-C of the RST Act, 1954, then so long as the entry is not deleted, the assessee is entitled to purchase goods covered by that entry without payment of tax or at concessional tax, CTO vs National Engg. Industries Ltd. (1992) 87-STC-144 (Raj) .

The dealer had acquired as a manufacturer of cement in the state and purchased earth moving machinery, bull dozers, dumpers & tipping wagons on concessional rate of tax. The Assessing Authority, however, imposed penalty for false representation. The court affirmed the decision of the H.C holding that so long the goods were written in the R.C, the penalty u/s 10A could not be imposed – State of Raj vs Jaipur Udyog (1972) – 30-STC- 565 (SC).

Wherever there is an infringement of any clause of section 10 of the CST Act, it does not automatically follow that the maximum penalty as provided must be imposed. A discretion, which is in the nature of judicial discretion must be exercised by the officer before determining the quantum of penalty. Rajalakshmi Textiles Finishing Mills vs STO (1976) 38-STC-302 (Ker).

The dealer purchased Plant & Machinery against ‘C’ form and run the factory for sometime. The Machinery was subsequently leased out but the Lessee too could not run the business. The dealer disposed of all the Machinery purchased against ‘C’ forms. The A.A imposed penalty for misuse of ‘C’ form. The Tribunal deleted the penalty holding that the dealer had shown sufficient cause for his conduct. The order of the Tribunal was held legal by the Allahabad High Court as no penalty is imposable where the dealer has a reasonable cause for his action. Commissioner of Sale Tax vs. Super Rubber Foam Products (1986) – 61- STC 325 (All).

2 Penalty for Non-apply for registration/ unregistered dealers

Section 16 of the HVAT Act, 2003 is identical to section 49 of the HGST Act, 1973. According to this section, if any information comes to the possession of the Assessing Authority and the Assessing Authority is satisfied that any dealer has been liable to pay tax in respect of any period but he has failed to apply for registration, an assessment can be framed in respect of such dealer within three years of the end of such period.

The Assessment so framed would be best judgment assessment and assessing authority will determine the tax due from him. The Assessing Authority would be competent to recover a penalty that would be equal to the amount found to be due from such dealer. A reasonable opportunity has to be extended to the defaulter before the penal action is taken against him.

The action envisaged in this section is mandatory as the provision uses the term “shall” for the Assessing Authority to take cognizance of the offence. Similarly for penalty also the same term “shall” has been used and according, the A.A. is expected to impose penalty equal to the amount of tax found to be due from such dealer. No term such as “willfully failed to apply” has been used in Haryana VAT Act and only term used is “ failed to apply”. A caution is required in this regard from unregistered dealers.

An order imposing penalty for failure to carry out a statutory obligation is the result of quasi criminal proceedings and penalty will not ordinarily be imposed unless the party obliged either acted deliberately in defiance of law or was guilty of conduct contumacious or dishonest or acted in conscious disregard of its obligation. Even if a minimum penalty is prescribed, the authority competent to impose the penalty will be justified in refusing to impose penalty, when there is a technical or venial breach of the provisions of the Act or where such breach flows from a bonafide belief that the offender is not liable to act in the manner prescribed by statute., Hindustan Steel Ltd. Vs State of Orissa (1970) 25 STC 211 (SC). This judgement of the Apex Court has not lost items sheen and still hold goods as far as the concept of mens rea is concerned.

The expression ‘willfully failed to apply for registration, connotes a deliberate failure to apply for registration in order to avoid taxation Commissioner of ST Vs. Brijraj Rameshwar (1966) 17 STC 295 (SC). See also Sardar Mohinder Singh Vs. Dy. Com. (1971) 28 STC 427 (MP).

Where the assessee, dealers in strips stores imported goods from foreign countries, keep them in bonded warehouses and sell the same to outgoing ships the bonafide belief of the dealer was that their transactions are not liable to sales tax and they are not required to get themselves registered and file returns. The Hon’ble High Court held that the assessability of the transactions was in doubt and the assessee had bonafide belief, therefore, penalty cannot be levied. State of Madras Vs. Fairmacs Trading Co. (1975) 35 STC 176 (Mad.).

Since the dealer got himself registered under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 u/s 7(2) of that Act but conducted business in the nature of inter-state trade for which registration under section 7(1) is necessary. Registration under section 7(2) cannot be said to be a registration under section 7(1) and therefore penalty for failure to get registered is imposable. Com. Of ST Vs Amir Brother (1979) 44 STC 200 (MP).

Pending registration application confers the dealer status of registered dealer but failing to produce account books when called for by the assessing authority confer power to it make best judgement assessment as the basic evidence collected by it duly put to the assessee. Sewa Singh Sadhu Singh Vs. State of Haryana (1981) 48 STC 117 (P&H).

In the case of Commissioner of Sales Tax vs. Prakash Trading Co. (1982) 51 STC 342 (All.), the assessee did not get himself registered although he was filing returns, paying taxes, maintaining regular books of account. On receipt of penalty notice, applied for registration. It was held that the assessee had not applied for registration, yet he was complying with the provisions relating to filing of returns, payment of tax and no defect was found in the books of account in which no defect was observed and was not found to be flouting the provisions of law to evade the tax due, the penalty was lawfully deleted.

It was held in the case of STO Vs. Gupta & Co. (1975) 35 STC 427 (Bom) that it was not necessary that the same Officer who initiated the penalty should impose the penalty. There is no bar in succeeding officer imposing such a penalty.

3 Penalty for failure to deduct tax in respect of Works-contract.

Section 24 of the HVAT Act, 2003 has cast an obligation on the Contractee to deduct tax source at prescribed rate in respect of works contract involving transfer of property in goods, executed by a Contractor in the State. This obligation is in respect all contracts exceeding Rs.1.00 lac value in a year.

In the event of Contractee having failed to discharge this duty i.e. he either does not deduct the tax at source or after deducting does not deposit in the account of the Government, then under the provisions of sub-section (6) of s. 24 of the H.VAT Act, the Assessing Authority may, at any time within 5 years of the close of the year when the default was made, and after giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard, order him in writing to pay by way of penalty a sum equal to the amount of tax which he failed to deduct or pay.

In this case, the Legislature has not used the word “shall” in the penal provisions and only the word “may” has been used. Obviously it is left to the discretion of the Assessing Authority whether or not to impose the penalty if the Contractee shows sufficient cause for not deducting the tax at source.

The vires of the provisions of TDS under the Sales-tax law have been upheld by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Tirath Ram Ahuja Ltd. vs. State of Haryana, STI-1991 (P & H High Court)-51.

No TDS on mobilization advance to be recovered from the running bills of the Contractor. Such advance cannot be termed as discharging of any liability for the valuable consideration payable for the execution of works contract involving transfer of property in goods, Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. vs. State of Haryana (1998) 109-STC-660 (P & H ).

While the opinion of Haryana authorities under VAT Act that in the case of contractor taking services of sub-contractor for the same works contract, the TDS is to be deducted from both contractor and sub-contractor, the AP High Court has held it otherwise in the case of Larsen & Toubro – 148-STC-216.

4 Penalty for unaccounted taxable goods u/s 29 (7)

Under the provisions of sub section (7) of S.29 of the HVAT Act, if any taxing authority as referred to in sub-section (1) of S.29 of the HVAT Act, finds any taxable goods in any office, shop, godown or any other place of business or any building or place or goods carrier or vehicle of, or which for the time being is under the control of a dealer on whom the provisions sub-section (2) of section 14 apply but not accounted for by him or the person incharge of the goods carrier or vehicle in his books, accounts, register or other documents, the officer may after affording him a reasonable opportunity of being heard impose on him a penalty equal to three times of tax rate applicable or maximum 30% of the value of such goods. Besides, he would also direct such person to enter such goods in his books of account.

The taxing authority is also empowered to impose penalty under this section on the market value of goods, if it is found that the goods so detected are under-priced.

Since this section has reference from S.14 (2) of the Act, the penal provisions of section can be invoked in the case of un-registered as well as registered dealers, even if they are liable or not liable to pay the tax. The analogy which emerges from this is that penal action can be initiated in cases where liability to tax has been fixed or the dealers who have applied for registration but have not been granted the registration or the registered dealers who are liable to pay the tax according to the prescription in sub-section (3) or sub-section (4) of this section.

Through these provisions, the Legislature has intended to impose penalty in respect of unaccounted goods lying in any premises or carrier or vehicle which is in the control of a dealer – registered or unregistered. The term used in this sub-section is “ finds” and obviously it would be through inspection and the competent Officer will have to observe the conditions laid down in sub-section (5) for carrying out inspection.

In sub-section (7) the Assessing Authority has been directed to “ impose….” Penalty after giving such dealer a reasonable opportunity of being heard. No terms such as “may” or “shall” has been used. Obviously, no discretion is left to the A.A. for may or may not and he has only to arrive at the findings and figures and do his job.

5 Penalty u/s 31 in cases of Roadside checking

The provisions of S.31 are replica of S.37 of the HGST Act. This section is widely misused section as far as the Departmental Authorities are concerned. The vehicles are intercepted and detained on small and technical breaches and is a cause of great amount of harassment to the dealers, drivers and transporters. The provisions are so much stretched that even Professionals fail to satisfy the authorities legally and thus paves way for the illegal satisfaction.

A penalty equal to three times of the tax plus a provisional tax at the applicable rate or 30% of the value of goods on which tax is sought to be evaded is provided in sub-section (8) of s.31 of the Act. Further it also provides that penalty can also be levied on the price difference if the goods are found to be under-priced. In such a case the penalty is to be imposed on the differential value only.

Sub-section (2) of S.31 of the HVAT Act requires the owner or person incharge of the goods or driver carrying goods in a goods carrier –

shall carry with him – a goods carrier record, a trip sheet or log book

alongwith a sale invoice or tax invoice or delivery note as the case may be,

and a declaration containing the prescribed particulars in the prescribed form

obtained from the prescribed authority, duly filled in and signed by the

prescribed person…….

A plain reading of this sub-section would reveal that a driver or person incharge shall carry any one of the transport documents out of GR, a Trip sheet or log book alongwith a sale invoice or tax invoice or delivery note and a declaration which in Haryana is VAT D3 (Inward or Outward) as the case may while transporting goods. In Haryana each District has been made into a separate segment for the purpose of VAT D3 Challans. Carrying the above documents is mandatory as the term used is “shall” and is not optional.

The penal provisions of S.31 of the HVAT Act and S. 37 of the HGST Act are identical and are purported to be serving the same purpose. However, there is very important hidden matter between the two. Sub-section (5) of S.37 of the HGST Act used the words …….officer has reasons to suspect that the goods under transport are not covered by proper and genuine documents as mentioned in sub-section (2) or (4) or that the person transporting the goods is attempting to evade payment of the tax due under this Act, he may, for reasons to be recorded ….

On the contrary sub-section (6) of S.31 of the HVAT Act, which is on the same lines as S.37 (5) of the HGST Act, uses the word …that the person transporting the goods is attempting to evade payment of tax, he may, for reasons to be recorded…

While under the HVAT Act it has been specifically mentioned that the person transporting the goods is attempting to evade payment of tax, whereas under the old Act it mentioned that there is attempt to evade the tax due under the Act. Under the HGST Act, word “tax” was not defined either under the Act or Rules framed there under, whereas under the HVAT Act, word “tax” has been defined u/s 2 (zk) as – tax means the tax levied under this Act.

There appears some anomaly on this account because, if the word “ tax” means tax levied under this Act, then penalty could not be levied where a proper tax is charged on the Invoice in respect of goods under the transportation even if there could be some technical lapse in the other documents including VAT D3. Levied means already levied and not leviable. A tax already levied, cannot be evaded again.

Similar language has been used in sub-section (8) of section 31 of the HVAT Act where the term used is – that the person transporting the goods attempting to evade payment of tax.

As regards the penal proceedings under this section, there are numerous contrary judgements and it is the most controvercial section in the Sales Tax/VAT Acts causing considerable hardship to the genuine dealers. The goods are detained for technical or flimsy grounds by the Officer deputed for road side checking and is cause of harassment and breeds corruption.

However, some of the issues have been decided such as – Penalty under this section can be levied only on the owner of the goods and not the thirty party such as Commission Agent, Issues relating to branch transfer cannot decided at the Check-post or roadside, presumption of evasion of tax in the absence of statutory challan is rebutable presumption, verification of market rate is essential before treating the goods as under-priced, for technical breaches without proving the evasion, clerical mistakes, without proper enquiry and establishing the intention to evade the tax.

6 Penalty for failure to furnish Returns – S.37A

A new section 37-A was inserted in the HVAT Act with effect from 20.3.2009 through which penalty has been provided for non-filing of returns in the case of registered dealers. Prior to this there was no provision as such. The penalty provided is Rs.100/- per day for first 10 days and Rs.200/- per day thereafter until the default continues. There is, however, no penalty for dealers having nil turnover.

The quantum of penalty is extremely high and harsh. Under the repealed Act, HGST Act, 1973 it was Rs.10/- per day for the default period.

7 Penalty for failure to maintain correct accounts and for furnishing incorrect returns

Section 38 of the HVAT Act deals with penalty for maintenance of false or incorrect accounts or documents with a view to suppressing sales, purchases, imports into tate, exports out of State, exports out of State or stocks of goods by the dealers. It is pertinent to note that the term used is “dealer” and not “registered dealer”. Accordingly it would apply to both registered and unregistered dealer.

While the first part of the section deals with the maintenance of false accounts, the second part deals with furnishing or producing before any authority under the Act, any account, return, document or information which is false or incorrect in any material particulars, whereby the dealer is found to be avoiding the tax liability, then such dealer is liability for penalty equal to thrice the amount of tax which would have been avoided, if such account, return, document or information had been accepted as true and correct.

The Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case reported at (1967) 19-STC-153, Om Parkash Rajinder Kumar vs. K.K. Opal, ETO, held that the use of words “ false, suppressing or concealed” in section 10 (7) of the Act clearly shows that penalty is not intended to be imposed under the sub-section for honest mistakes or clerical errors or omissions but only for deliberate false entries or false evidence involving some like mens rea.

8 Penalty under section – 39 –illegal collection of tax

This section deals with penalty liable to be imposed on any person, who is not a registered dealer or is not authorised to collect tax. No person who is not registered dealer and not competent to collect the tax shall do so in respect of any sale of goods effected by him in the State and further a registered dealer is not authorised to collect any tax, which is not in accordance with the Act and rules framed thereunder.

Accordingly, if an unregistered dealer collects any tax in the State in respect of sale of goods or an authorised dealer collect any tax which he was legally not competent to collect, then the Assessing Authority, may after affording such person a reasonable opportunity of being heard, direct him to pay by way of penalty equal to the sum which may have been so collected.

Sub-section (2) of S.39 takes into its ambit the cases where a person willfully collects any amount by way of tax in contravention of the provisions contained in sub-sec. (1), the A.A. may after affording such a person an opportunity of being heard, impose a penalty equal to the amount of tax. The penalty would be in addition to the illegal collection.

In this section the term used are “Assessing Authority” and “may”, which means only the Assessing Authority can impose the penalty and again he may or may not impose the penalty after considering the explanation offered by the dealer in response to the show cause notice issued by him.

There is hardly any such dealer deliberately collecting higher tax than what is applicable. Only some bonafide omissions do take place here and there where there is some ambiguity on tax rates applicable to the commodity sold.

9 Penalty under section –40

This is a general penalty clause whereby it is provided that whosoever (means any person whether registered or unregistered dealer) contravenes or fails to comply with any provisions of this Act or Rules made thereunder or any direction given or made, shall be liable for imposition of penalty not exceeding rupees two thousand but not less than one thousand rupees.

However, an exception is provided whereby this section cannot be invoked where a specific penalty or levy of interest is provided, meaning thereby that penalty under this section cannot be initiated or imposed if any specific penalty for contravention is provided in any other section of this Act or levy of interest is provided.

The final portion of this section is fatal too as daily penalty of one hundred rupees is provided if the contravention or failure continues.

10 Penalty under section – 41 (Limitation for imposition of penalty)

This section provides that no penalty shall be imposed on a dealer by any “taxing authority” after the expiry of two years following the date when the assessment of tax becomes final for the period during which offence was committed. This limitation covers the penalties imposable under sub-section (5) of section (7), section (16), section 38 and section 39 of the Act.

While sub-section (5) of section 7 relates to misuse of goods purchased at concessional rate against VAT-D1, section 38 relates to failure to maintain correct books of account and furnishing of false or incorrect information and section 39 prohibits unlawful collection of tax and unregistered and registered dealer.

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PTCL Act – Effect

PTCL ACT (the Karnataka scheduled caste and scheduled tribes (prohibition of transfer of certain land) Act, 1978 – whether SC/ST peopl are taking revenge on us?

“Ignorance of law is not an excuse”

No one can take back these words or so… Public would have not heard that, when it comes to PTCL. We are all aware in general, that once the property is purchased for a valuable consideration the vendor cannot ask to return the property as per Indian contract act.

Many of us are not aware that now SC/ST people are selling their properties for a valuable consideration and filing appeal to restore that land once they are done with their sale.

If we need to verify the grant rules, we need to go back and check the Mysore land revenue code, 1888 to till date amendments. Judgments on this rules say that you should not go as per the grant certificate (land revenue grant rules prevails over grant certificate).

As per the land grant rules, there is a prohibition forever and it varies from 10 to 20 years for each year’s amendment, whether our government is expecting us as a public to be aware about this, when many advocates are not even aware about the complete land grant rules, How the public can be aware about this?

I heard many grantees are entering into sale agreement and simultaneously asking their advocate to prepare appeal for restoration of the grant; poor public is losing their hard earned money. In some cases after grantees sell their land they wait for house to come up, so they can get their land along with house.

In one of our case, as per the grant, the land has been sold after 15 years by the depressed class (SC/ST) for valid consideration in the year 1972 i.e after expiry of the 15 years (land was granted in 1939). After selling, they have filed appeal for restoration in the year 1979 as per PTCL but they lost the case in front of Assistant Commissioner on the ground that alienation has happened after 15 years.

After 24 years their grand children had filed writ petition in the high court and high court has condoned the delay of filing appeal and granted order in favor of grantee because even though the land has granted with a condition of 15 years of non-alienation period, the actualnon-alienation is forever.

Please note that this appeal is filed after commissioner has granted permission for converting land usage from agriculture land to non agriculture land, also during the proceedings period 60 to 70 people have bought plots in this layout and houses were built with BBMP plan approvals. “People are paying the tax and betterment charges for the land under litigation” and the government is not bothered to inform them during the registration time or at the time of collecting the tax, They are just bothered about the money or income they get.

“How can government provide basic facilities (Electricity, Sanitation, Good Roads etc.,) for the land under litigation and collect the taxes”?

“Government could have intimated the people at any point, rather than put a person in a situation like Hell.”

Several advocates who verified the document, working for different banks could not get  a clue regarding the litigation. Once the bank has

approved the loan, many people have bought houses in this layout through housing loan scheme

“When Advocates could not find the difference between the land under litigation, How can you expect a common man to do so”? How ignorance of law is not excuse can be applied here?

Now SC/ST people are well educated and few of them are trying to cheat others and PTCL law is helping them to do this.

In the above case 60 to 70 people, who availed housing loan has to find rented houses and pay the  housing loan without property, strictly speaking we will be working as a bonded labours for next 20 years or more (just for dreaming to have a property of our own).

“Rent (For staying) + House loan (For not staying) – How can a common man bear both?? When one is difficult to bear ”.

“How sad to know that there is an injustice within the boundary of law”

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