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Tuesday, 2 July 2013

Transcore Vs UOI-A Judicial Monocracy to Anyhow Uphold Unwarranted Multiple Actions of the Banks/FIs

INTRODUCTION:

(1)The Statement of Objects and Reasons to the Enforcement of Security Interest and Recovery of Debts Laws (Amendment) Act, 2004 (hereinafter called “the Amending Act 2004”), inter alia, has described background of the Amendment Act, 2004 thus “In view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mardia Chemicals Ltd. and Others v. Union of India and Others, it had become necessary to amend the provisions of the Securitisation Act, 2002. Since the Parliament was not in session and it was necessary to take immediate action to amend the said Securitisation Act for the above reasons, the Enforcement of Security Interest and Recovery of Debts Laws (Amendment) Ordinance, 2004 was promulgated on the 11th November,  2004. The said Ordinance amends the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter called “the DRT Act”) and the Companies Act, 1956”.

(1.1) The Statement of Objects and Reasons further states thus “Chapter III of the Ordinance amends the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 so as to enable the bank or financial institution to withdraw, with the permission of the Debts Recovery Tribunal, the application made to it and thereafter take action under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002.” (emphasis supplied). It is pertinent to note here that the object of insertion of the three provisos to Section 19(1) of DRT Act, vide the Amending Act, 2004, is to enable the secured creditors to take fresh action, rather a more effective action to speedily recover their debts, if required, by enforcement of security or other measures specified in sub-section (4) of section 13 of the Securitisation Act, however, not to take multiple actions under the DRT Act, as well as the Securitisation Act.

(2) Section 19 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 has, inter alia, provided as follows.

Section 19. Application to the Tribunal.—

(1) Where a bank or a financial institution has to recover any debt from any person, it may make an application to the Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction—………..x……….x……….x……..x……….x…….

Provided that the bank or financial institution may, with the permission of the Debts Recovery Tribunal, on an application made by it, withdraw the application, whether made before or after the Enforcement of Security Interest and Recovery of Debts Laws (Amendment) Act, 2004 for the purpose of taking action under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (54 of 2002), if no such action had been taken earlier under that Act:

Provided further that any application made under the first proviso for seeking permission from the Debts Recovery Tribunal to withdraw the application made under sub‑section (1) shall be dealt with by it as expeditiously as possible and disposed of within thirty days from the date of such application:

Provided also that in case the Debts Recovery Tribunal refuses to grant permission for withdrawal of the application filed under this sub‑section, it shall pass such orders after recording the reasons therefor.” (emphasis mine in all above paras)

(2.1) Notwithstanding the mandatory language of the three Provisos inserted by the Amendment Act, 2004 to section 19 of DRT Act (especially keeping in view the Statement of Objects and Reasons),  hon’ble Supreme Court in  M/s Transcore Vs Union of India & Anr {(2008) 1 SCC 125; Date of Judgment: 29/11/2006}, has held, inter alia, as follows.

“For the above reasons, we hold that withdrawal of the O.A. pending before the DRT under the DRT Act is not a pre-condition for taking recourse to NPA Act. It is for the bank/FI to exercise its discretion as to cases in which it may apply for leave and in cases where they may not apply for leave to withdraw. We do not wish to spell out those circumstances because the said first proviso to Section 19(1) is an enabling provision, which provision may deal with myriad circumstances which we do not wish to spell out herein.” (emphasis supplied).

(2.2) With respect, it is humbly submitted that even hon’ble Supreme Court can not  put an interpretation, which is wholly inconsistent with a statutory provision and thus can not violate the well settled ‘Literal Rule of Interpretation’. Further, now a days, a good majority of the creditors are taking undue advantage of the misconception created by the ‘Transcore SC judgment’ (supra) and, as a matter of right, filing the Original Application (hereinafter called ‘O.A.’) before the DRT under the DRT Act, even after taking recourse to the Securitisation Act, which has not at all been authorized even by the ‘Transcore SC judgment’ (supra).
Literal Rule of Interpretation of Statutes

(3) Recently, hon’ble Supreme Court in B. Premanand & Ors. Vs. Mohan Koikal & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 2684 of 2007; Decided on 16 March, 2011) has explained the literal rule of interpretation of statutes. The rule provides that the meaning has to be ascertained from the text of the law itself. The essence of the judgment is given below.

(3.1) The Court explained the concept that if there is a conflict between equity and the law, it is the law which must prevail. It may be mentioned in this connection that the first and foremost principle of interpretation of a statute in every system of interpretation is the literal rule of interpretation. The other rules of interpretation e.g. the mischief rule, purposive interpretation etc. can only be resorted to when the plain words of a statute are ambiguous or lead to no intelligible results or if read literally would nullify the very object of the statute. Where the words of a statute are absolutely clear and unambiguous, recourse cannot be had to the principles of interpretation other than the literal rule, vide Swedish Match AB vs. Securities and Exchange Board, India, AIR 2004 SC 4219.

(3.2) The legislature is presumed to have made no mistake. The presumption is that it intended to say what it has said. Assuming there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the Court cannot correct or make up the deficiency, vide Delhi Financial Corporation vs. Rajiv Anand 2004 (11) SCC 625. Where the legislative intent is clear from the language, the Court should give effect to it, vide Government of Andhra Pradesh vs. Road Rollers Owners Welfare Association 2004(6) SCC 210, and the Court should not seek to amend the law in the garb of interpretation.

(3.3) Ordinarily, it is not proper for the Court to depart from the literal rule as that would really be amending the law in the garb of interpretation, which is not permissible vide J.P. Bansal vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. AIR 2003 SC 1405, State of Jharkhand & Anr. vs. Govind Singh JT 2004(10) SC 349 etc.. It is for the legislature to amend the law and not the Court vide State of Jharkhand & Anr. vs. Govind Singh JT 2004(10) SC 349.

(3.4) Hence, there should be judicial restraint in this connection, and the temptation to do judicial legislation should be eschewed by the Courts. In fact, judicial legislation is an oxymoron (Author’s Note-“oxymoron” means a phrase in which two words of contradictory meaning are used together for special effect, e.g. “wise fool” or “legal murder”).

(3.5) The function of the Court is only to expound the law and not to legislate vide District Mining Officer vs. Tata Iron and Steel Company 2002 (7) SCC 358. If we accept the interpretation canvassed by the learned counsel for the private respondents, we will really be legislating because in the guise of interpretation we will be really amending Rule 27(c) of the Rules.

(3.6) The literal rule of interpretation really means that there should be no interpretation. In other words, we should read the statute as it is, without distorting or twisting its language.

(4) Further, hon’ble Supreme Court in Narayan Chandra Ghosh Vs UCO Bank & Ors. {(2011) 4 SCC 548; 2011 STPL (Web) 310 SC; Decided on 18.03.2011} has held, inter alia, as follows (SCC pp 550, para 8).

“8……………Bearing in mind the object of the Act, the conditions hedged in the said proviso cannot be said to be onerous. Thus, we hold that the requirement of pre-deposit under sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Act is mandatory and there is no reason whatsoever for not giving full effect to the provisions contained in Section 18 of the Act. In that view of the matter, no court, much less the Appellate Tribunal, a creature of the Act itself, can refuse to give full effect to the provisions of the Statute. We have no hesitation in holding that deposit under the second proviso to Section 18(1) of the Act being a condition precedent for preferring an appeal under the said Section, the Appellate Tribunal had erred in law in entertaining the appeal without directing the appellant to comply with the said mandatory requirement.”

Admittedly, the term “no court” includes the Supreme Court of India. Consequently, with respect, it is humbly submitted that even hon’ble Supreme Court can not refuse to give full effect to the provisions of the three provisos to section 19 of  the DRT Act, and therefore, can not  put an interpretation in the ‘Transcore SC judgment’ (supra), which is wholly inconsistent with the statutory provision.

Banks/FIs are not settling even simple problems of the borrowers relating to revival and rehabilitation.

(5) Bureaucracy in Banks/FIs is not deciding and settling even simple problems of the borrowers relating to revival and rehabilitation. During our working we have experienced that due to artificial fear of being questioned by higher management, the bureaucracy in Banks/FIs is deliberately neglecting statutory ‘RBI guidelines’ and not deciding and settling even simple problems of the borrowers relating to revival and rehabilitation, consequently, forcing them to become ‘NPA’. Being generally ignorant of this attitude of Banks/FIs the majority of public is crying for non recovery of so called ‘Public Money’, losing sight of the fact that the borrowers are also a very important section of public, and intelligent persons running an industry, which generates employment and revenue through various Govt taxes and payment of huge interest and service charges to the Bank/FI. Instead, the matter is passed on to the court of law under DRT Act, 1993 and/or Securitisation Act, 2002. The Supreme Court has criticized this attitude on several occasions, but there is no outcome. In author’s view, only after few cases of counter-claim for loss and damages, for wrongdoings committed by the Banks/FIs, would be decided against the Banks/FIs, then only one can expect any change in the said non-cooperative attitude of the Banks/FIs. Needless to mention that the legal battle is long drawn, time consuming and expensive. For further details, the readers interested may kindly refer my another exhaustive Article titled- “Lies Vs Truth Regarding Recovery of ‘Industrial Loan” at http://taxguru.in/corporate-law/lies-truth-recovery-industrial-loan.html (and also at http://www.lawyersclubindia.com/articles/Lies-Vs-Truth-Regarding-Recovery-Of-Industrial-Loan–3725.asp)
Analysis of the DRT Act, 1993 in the ‘Transcore SC judgment’

(6) Extracts taken from records of DRT Legal Solutions: The following extracts have been taken by the author, with permission, from the records of DRT Legal Solutions, Indore(www.drtsolutions.com). The three provisos under Sec 19 of the DRT Act were inserted on 11.11.2004 and the related matter was examined by the Hon’ble Supreme Court  in the matter of Transcore Vs. Union of India & Anr {(2008) 1 SCC 125} wherein it was decided on 29.11.2006, inter alia, as follows:-

“Analysis of the DRT Act, 1993:

The DRT Act, 1993 has been enacted to provide for the establishment of Tribunals for expeditious adjudication and recovery of debts due to banks/ FIs.

Section 2(g) defines a ‘debt’ to mean any liability which is claimed as dues from any person by a bank, FI or by a consortium of banks. It covers secured, unsecured and assigned debts. It also covers debts payable under a decree, arbitration award or under a mortgage.

Chapter III deals with jurisdiction, powers and authority of DRT.  Section 17 refers to jurisdiction of DRT. Section 17 states that  DRT shall exercise the jurisdiction, powers and authority to entertain and decide applications from the banks and FIs. for recovery of debts due to such banks/ FIs. (emphasis supplied). Section 19 of the Act inter alia states that where a bank or FI has to recover any debt, it may make an application to the DRT. By amending Act 30 of 2004, the three provisos were inserted in Section 19(1). Under the first proviso, the bank or FI may, with the permission of the DRT, on an application made by it, withdraw the O.A. for the purpose of taking action under the NPA Act, if no such action has been taken earlier under that Act. Under the second proviso, it is further provided that, any application made for withdrawal to the DRT under the first proviso shall be dealt with expeditiously and shall be disposed of within thirty days from the date of such application. The reason is obvious. Under Section 36 of the NPA Act the bank of FI is entitled to take steps under section 13(4) in respect of the financial asset provided it is made within the period of limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act, 1963. Therefore, the second proviso to Section 19(1) states that the DRT shall decide the withdrawal application as far as possible within thirty days from the date of application by the bank or FI. The third proviso to Section 19(1) states that in case the DRT refuses to grant permission/ leave for withdrawal, it shall give reasons thereof. Section 19(6) provides for the defendant’s claim to set-off against the bank’s demand for a certain sum of money. Similarly, Section 19(8) gives right to the defendant to set a counter claim. Section 19(12) empowers the DRT to make an interim order by way of injunction, stay or attachment before judgment debarring the defendant from transferring, alienating or otherwise deal with, or disposing of, his properties and assets. This can be done only with the prior permission of the  DRT. Under Section 19(13), the DRT is empowered to direct the defendant to furnish security in cases where the DRT is satisfied that the defendant is likely to dispose of the property or cause damage to the property in order to defeat the decree which may ultimately be passed in favour of the bank or FI. Under Section 19(18) the DRT is also empowered on grounds of equity to appoint a receiver of any property, before or after grant of certificate for recovery of debt. Under Section 19(19), a recovery certificate issued against a company can be enforced by the DRT which can order the property to be sold and the sale proceeds to be distributed amongst the secured creditors in accordance with the provisions of Section 529-A of  the Companies Act, 1956 and pay the balance/ surplus, if any, to the debtor-company. Section 20 of the DRT Act provides for appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. Section 21 deals with the necessity of the applicant to pre-deposit seventy-five per cent of the amount of debt due from him as determined by the DRT under Section 19. Section 25 refers to modes of recovery of debts. It provides for three modes, namely, (a) attachment and sale; (b) arrest of the defendant; and (c) appointment of a receiver for the management of the properties of the defendant. There are other modes of recovery contemplated by Section 28 which states that where a certificate has been issued by the DRT to the Recovery Officer under Section 19(7), the Recovery Officer may, without prejudice to the modes of recovery specified in Section 25, recover the amount of debt by any one or more of the modes mentioned in Section 28. Section 29 of the DRT Act incorporates provisions of the Second and Third Schedules to the Income Tax Act, 1961.

On analysing the above provisions of the DRT Act, we find that the said Act is a complete Code by itself as far as recovery of debt is concerned. It provides for various modes of recovery. It incorporates even the provisions of the Second and Third Schedules to the Income Tax Act, 1961. Therefore, the debt due under the recovery certificate can be recovered in various ways. The remedies mentioned therein are complementary to each other. The DRT Act provides for adjudication. It provides for adjudication of disputes as far as the debt due is concerned. It covers secured as well as unsecured debts. However, it does not rule out applicability of the provisions of the TP Act, in particular Sections 69 and  69A of that Act. Further in cases where the debt is secured by pledge of shares or immovable properties, with the passage of time and delay in the DRT proceedings, the value of the pledged assets or mortgaged properties invariably falls. On account of inflation, value of the assets in the hands of the bank/FI invariably depletes which, in turn, leads to asset liability mis-match. These contingencies are not taken care of by the DRT Act and, therefore, Parliament had to enact the NPA Act, 2002.” (emphasis supplied).

(6.1) A combined reading of the said provisos under Sec 19 of the DRT Act and, the said law laid down by the Apex Court, appears to conclude that  the secured creditor may invoke Securitisation Act during the pendency of proceedings under the DRT Act. However, this conclusion merits to be differentiated keeping in view the facts and circumstances of that particular case. The Author, therefore, feels that the impact of the continuance of such proceedings under the DRT Act must be considered by all concerned keeping in view the repercussions, consequences and cost impact.

(6.2) The Securitisation Act, 2002 (hereinafter called ‘the Act’) is a complete code in itself. Apart from being the latest enactment as well as having much wider powers compared with the DRT Act, proceedings under the same alone should continue. In the scheme of this Act, the debt is already crystallized by the secured creditor and the notice under Section 13(2) of the Act is an action taken and not show cause notice. The secured creditor is legally armed with powers for recovery action without going to court of law. The interest of the borrower is safeguarded with the right to approach the trial court of DRT by filing an Securitization Application (‘SA’) u/s 17 of the Act, which is held to be in lieu of a civil suit by a three judge bench of hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Mardia Chemicals Ltd.. Vs U.O.I. & Ors. {A.I.R 2004 SC 2371; (2004) 4 SCC 311; (2004) 59 CLA 380 (SC); Date of Judgment: 08/04/2004}.

(6.3) As aforesaid, now a days, a good majority of the creditors are taking undue advantage of the misconstruction created by the ‘Transcore SC judgment’ (supra) and, as a matter of right, filing the O.A. before the DRT under the DRT Act, even after already having taken recourse to the Securitisation Act, which has not at all been authorized even by the ‘Transcore SC judgment’ (supra). During these securitization proceedings the recovery is intended out of the secured assets, contested by the borrower before the court of law i.e. DRT by way of SA filed by the borrower. On the other hand in the scheme of the DRT Act, the OA is filed by the creditor requesting the DRT to determine the debt due culminating into issue of the Recovery Certificate followed by the execution against the said Recovery Certificate.

(6.4) In view of above, in a given case, having already issued Notice u/s 13(2) and filing of the SA u/s 17 of the Securitisation Act before hon’ble Debts Recovery Tribunal, the earlier proceedings initiated under the O.A. become virtually infructuous. If, the proceedings are further carried out, it would be nothing but additional and duplicate adjudication to determine the debt due. Considerable time and costs are involved to come to the stage of issue of the Recovery Certificate as well as the execution thereof. If the O.A. is dismissed, immediately after taking recourse to the Securitisation Act, on account of such infructuous proceedings, the rights and liabilities of the secured creditor are not affected at all. Further no additional advantage or rights accrue to the secured creditor if the said proceedings initiated under the O.A. are carried out.

(6.5) In such a case, we have already started making application to hon’ble DRT for the dismissal of the O.A., which would result in reducing the pendency and  burden on the DRT. On the other hand, it adds to the disposal performance of the DRT which will be in line with the objectives of formation of the DRTs i.e. expeditious disposal of bank litigations. It is needless to mention that there is tremendous increase in pendency in Indian Courts so much so that there are more than three crore cases pending vide news item dated 07.03.2010 (copy attached ANNEXURE ‘A’) in which it is mentioned that Justice V.V. Rao, a sitting judge of Hon’ble Andhra Pradesh High Court has said that it will take 320 years to clear the pendency. Hence, due application of mind should be used at every stage of pending matters. If a virtually duplicate matter like, if in a given case the OA is allowed to proceed and at any stage if the matter goes to High Court and Supreme Court, it will unnecessarily add to the said pendency of three crore cases.

(6.6) On one hand, the creditor shall not at all be affected by the proposed dismissal of the O.A., the borrower would be unnecessarily subjected to extra avoidable time and costs due to continuance of the O.A.. Hon’ble Debts Recovery Tribunal has full powers, authority and jurisdiction to consider these aspects due to the three provisos under Sec 19(1) of the DRT Act, 1993. Further, in this  connection, kind attention of all concerned is drawn to the leading SC Judgment in the matter of SP Gupta vs Union of India vide citation 1982 AIR (SC) 149, extract from para 27 is reproduced below. Accordingly, also Hon’ble Debts Recovery Tribunal is fully empowered to consider the said aspects relating to cost impacts and avoidable work load of continuing the infructuous O.A.:-

“(27) . . . . . . we would therefore prefer to begin the discussion by making a few prefatory remarks highlighting what the true function of the judiciary should be in a country like India which is marching along the road to social justice with the banner of democracy and the rule of law, for the principle of independence of the judiciary is not an abstract conception but it is a living faith which must derive its inspiration from the constitutional charter and its nourishment and sustenance from the constitutional values. It is necessary for every Judge to remember constantly and continually that our Constitution is not a non- aligned national charter. It is a document of social revolution which casts an obligation on every instrumentality including the judiciary, which is a separate but equal branch of the State, to transform the status quo ante into a new human order in which justice, social, economic and political will inform all institutions of national life and there will be equality of status and opportunity for all. The judiciary has therefore a socio economic destination and a creative function. It has to use the words of Glanville Austin, to become an arm of the socio-economic revolution and perform an active role calculated to bring social justice within the reach of the common man. It cannot remain content to act merely as an umpire but it must be functionally involved in the goal of socio-economic justice. The British concept of justicing, which to quote Justice Krishna Iyer, is still “bugged by the heirs of our colonial legal culture and shared by many on the bench” is that “the business of a Judge is to hold his tongue until the last possible moment and to try to be as wise as he is paid to look” and in the same strain are the words quoted by Professor Gordon Reid from ‘a memorandum to the Victorian government by Irvin, C. J. in 1923 where the judicial function was idealized in the following words :

THE duty of His Majesty’s Judges is to hear and determine issues of fact and of law arising between the king and the subject or between a subject and a subject presented in a form enabling judgment to be passed upon them, and when passed, to be enforced by a process of law. There begins and ends the function of the judiciary.

Now this approach to the judicial function may be alright for a stable and static society but not for a society pulsating with urges of gender justice, worker justice, minorities justice, dalit justice and equal justice, between chronic unequals. Where the contest is between those who are socially or economically unequal, the judicial process may prove disastrous from the point of view of social justice, if the Judge adopts a merely passive or negative role and does not adopt a positive and creative approach. The judiciary cannot remain a mere bystander or spectator but it must become an active participant in the judicial process ready to use law in the service of social justice through a proactive goal-oriented approach. But this cannot be achieved unless we have judicial cadres who share the fighting faith of the Constitution and who are imbued with the constitutional values. The necessity of a judiciary which is in tune with the social philosophy of the Constitution has nowhere been better emphasised than in the words of Justice Krishna Iyer which we quote: APPOINTMENT of Judges is a serious process where judicial expertise, legal learning, life’s experience and high integrity are components, but above all are two indispensables – social philosophy in active unison with the socialistic articles of the Constitution, and second, but equally important, built-in resistance to pushes and pressures by class interests, private prejudices, government threats and blandishments, party loyalties and contrary economic and politicial ideologies projecting into pronouncements.

Justice Krishna lyer goes on to say in his inimitable style :

JUSTICE Cardozo approvingly quoted President Theodore Roosevelt’s stress on the social philosophy of the Judges, which shakes and shapes the course of a nation and, therefore, the choice of Judges for the higher Courts which makes and declares the law of the land, must be in tune with the social philosophy of the Constitution. Not mastery of the law alone, but social vision and creative craftsmanship are important inputs in successful justicing.

What is necessary is to have Judges who are prepared to fashion new tools, forge new methods, innovate new strategies and evolve a new jurisprudence, who are  judicial statesmen with a social vision and a creative faculty and who have, above all, a deep sense of commitment to the Constitution with an activist approach and obligation for accountability, not to any party in power nor to the opposition nor to the classes which are vociferous but to the half- hungry millions of India who are continually denied their basic human rights. We need Judges who are alive to the socio-economic realities of Indian life, who are anxious to wipe every tear from every eye, who have faith in the constitutional values and who are ready to use law as an instrument for achieving the constitutional objectives. This has to be the broad blueprint of the appointment project for the higher echelons of judicial service. It is only if appointments of Judges are made with these considerations weighing predominantly with the appointing authority that we can have a truly independent judiciary committed only to the Constitution and to the people of India. The concept of independence of the judiciary is a noble concept which’ inspires the constitutional scheme and constitutes the- foundation on which rests the edifice of our democratic polity. If there is one principle which runs through the entire fabric of the Constitution, it is the principle of the rule of law and under the Constitution, it is the judiciary which is entrusted with the task of keeping every organ of the State within the limits of the law and thereby making the rule of law meaningful and effective. It is to aid the judiciary in this task that the power of judicial review has been conferred upon the judiciary and it is by exercising this power which constitutes one of the most potent weapons in armory of the law, that the judiciary seeks to protect the citizen against violation of his constitutional or legal rights or misuse or abuse of power by the State or its officers. The judiciary stands between the citizen and the State as a bulwark against executive excesses and misuse or abuse of power by the executive and therefore it is absolutely essential that the judiciary must be free from executive pressure or influence and this has been secured by the Constitution-makers by making elaborate provisions in the Constitution to which detailed reference has been made in the judgments in Sankalchand Sheth case. But it is necessary to remind ourselves that the concept of independence of the judiciary is not limited only to independence from executive pressure or influence but it is a much wider concept which takes within its sweep independence from many other pressures and prejudices. It has many dimensions, namely, fearlessness of other power centres, economic or political, and freedom from prejudices acquired and nourished by the class to which the Judges belong. If we may again quote the eloquent words of Justice Krishna Iyer :INDEPENDENCE of the Judiciary is not genuflexion ; nor is it opposition to every proposition of government. It is neither Judiciary made to Opposition measure nor government’s pleasure.

The tycoon, the communalist, the parochialist, the faddist, the extremist and radical reactionary lying coiled up and subconsciously shaping judicial mentations are menaces to judicial independence when they are at variance with Parts III and IV of the Paramount Parchment. Judges should be of stern stuff and tough fibre, unbending before power, economic or political, and they must uphold the core principle of the rule of law which says, “Be you ever so high, the law is above you.” This is the principle of independence of the judiciary which is vital for the establishment of real participatory. democracy, maintenance of the rule of law as a dynamic concept and delivery of social justice to the vulnerable S. of the community. It is this principle of independence of the judiciary which we must keep in mind while interpreting the relevant provisions of the Constitution” (emphasis supplied)

(7) It is no wonder that such an approach will be vehemently opposed by the creditors and, the concerned Bank/FI authorities will fight up to the Supreme Court. In this connection it is relevant to submit that this attitude of the statutory authorities like banks and financial institutions, has been criticized by the Supreme Court vide following extracts from its famous judgment decided on 30.10.2009 in the matter of Urban Improvement Trust, Bikaner vs Mohan Lal , citation  being (2010) 1 SCC 512; 2009 AIOL 1235 :-

“4. It is a matter of concern that such frivolous and unjust litigation by governments and statutory authorities are on the increase. Statutory Authorities exist to discharge statutory functions in public interest. They should be responsible litigants. They cannot raise frivolous and unjust objections, nor act in a callous and highhanded manner. They can not behave like some private litigants with profiteering motives. Nor can they resort to unjust enrichment. They are expected to show remorse or regret when their officers act negligently or in an overbearing manner. When glaring wrong acts by their officers is brought to their notice, for which there is no explanation or excuse, the least that is expected is restitution/restoration to the extent possible with appropriate compensation. Their harsh attitude in regard to genuine grievances of the public and their indulgence in unwarranted litigation requires to be corrected.

5. This Court has repeatedly expressed the view that the governments and statutory authorities should be model or ideal litigants and should not put forth false, frivolous, vexatious, technical (but unjust) contentions to obstruct the path of justice. We may refer to some of the decisions in this behalf.

5.1 In Dilbagh Rai Jarry v. Union of India [1973 (3) SCC 554] where this Court extracted with approval, the following statement (from an earlier decision of the Kerala High Court):

“The State, under our Constitution, undertakes economic activities in a vast and widening public sector and inevitably gets involved in disputes with private individuals. But it must be remembered that the State is no ordinary party trying to win a case against one of its own citizens by hook or by crook; for the State’s interest is to meet honest claims, vindicate a substantial defence and never to score a technical point or overreach a weaker party to avoid a just liability or secure an unfair advantage, simply because legal devices provide such an opportunity. The State is a virtuous litigant and looks with unconcern on immoral forensic successes so that if on the merits the case is weak, government shows a willingness to settle the dispute regardless of prestige and other lesser motivations which move private parties to fight in court. The lay-out on litigation costs and executive time by the State and its agencies is so staggering these days because of the large amount of litigation in which it is involved that a positive and wholesome policy of cutting back on the volume of law suits by the twin methods of not being tempted into forensic show-downs where a reasonable adjustment is feasible and ever offering to extinguish a pending proceeding on just terms, giving the legal mentors of government some initiative and authority in this behalf. I am not indulging in any judicial homily but only echoing the dynamic national policy on State litigation evolved at a Conference of Law Ministers of India way back in 1957.

5.3 In a three Judge Bench judgment of Bhag Singh & Ors. v. Union Territory of Chandigarhthrough LAC, Chandigarh [(1985) 3 SCC 737]:

“3… The State Government must do what is fair and just to the citizen and should not, as far as possible, except in cases where tax or revenue is received or recovered without protest or where the State Government would otherwise be irretrievably be prejudiced, take up a technical plea to defeat the legitimate and just claim of the citizen.”

6. Unwarranted litigation by governments and statutory authorities basically stem from the two general baseless assumptions by their officers. They are:

(i)   All claims against the government/statutory authorities should be viewed as illegal and should be resisted and fought up to the highest court of the land.

(ii)  If taking a decision on an issue could be avoided, then it is prudent not to decide the issue and let the aggrieved party approach the Court and secures a decision.

The reluctance to take decisions, or tendency to challenge all orders against them, is not the policy of the governments or statutory authorities, but is attributable to some officers who are responsible for taking decisions and/or officers in charge of litigation. Their reluctance arises from an instinctive tendency to protect themselves against any future accusations of wrong decision making, or worse, of improper motives for any decision making.”

(7.1) On account of the above attitude of the statutory authorities like banks and financial institutions, so long as the business is going all right, they even take the credit, but the moment business goes through a rough phase, these authorities, instead of helping, rush to court of law for recovery even indulging into multiple legal actions. In court of law also they oppose everything and fight up to the Supreme Court. It is also important to note here that at present many DRTs in the country are not having regular POs. As a result, pendency is going up day by day.

(8) Still further, in support of my above contentions, kindly have a look at the following news item and then decide yourself, who is the real culprit.

“ONE LAKH CRORE CREDITS ON INDUSTRIALIST FAMILIES
http://jaipur.co/one-lakh-crore-credits-on-industrialist-families/

Jaipur: The reputation of the government bank is losing its credibility because of Industrialist families. The loan of 1.5 lakh crore taken by the government bank is still missing, out of which more than 70 percent loan is taken by the industrialist families.

On Sunday (30.10.2011), All India Bank Officers Association’s two day conference being here in which this issue was brought in to light. The National President Alok Khare and General Secretary R.J. Sridharan said in the meeting that private banks earned around 45 thousand crore in the year 2011, but because of centre’s leniency around 20 thousand crore rupees is being distributed like corporate loan.

The banks which are running on the orders of the Reserve Bank publish the defaulter list of the common people but they don’t have the list of the defaulters of the corporate families. According to the bankers, in the Bank Director’s meeting also this list is never mentioned, because of which till today the list have not come into existence. Some specialists blame the government for this.For the common man there are norms to return the money in a given time whereas there are no norms for the corporate families. There are laws of recovery but it is only implemented on the common man.” (emphasis supplied)

CONCLUSION

(9) The impugned concept may be explained in the following terms;

(a)The literal rule of interpretation really means that there should be no interpretation. In other words, we should read the statute as it is, without distorting or twisting its language.

(b) Consequently, in author’s view, the three Provisos inserted by the Amendment Act, 2004 to section 19 of DRT Act are plain and clear. Hence, the literal rule of interpretation will apply to it. Further, even if there is a conflict between equity and the law, it is the law which must prevail. The law, which is contained in the three Provisos, is clearly in favour of my aforesaid contentions.

(c) The language of the three Provisos inserted by the Amendment Act, 2004 to section 19 of DRT Act is clear and hence all concerned would have to follow that language.

(d) The function of the Court is only to expound the law and not to legislate. If, we accept the interpretation put in ‘Transcore SC judgment’, the Supreme Court will really be legislating because in the guise of interpretation the Court will be really amending the three Provisos inserted by the Amendment Act, 2004 to section 19 of DRT Act.(END)

Sarfaesi Act, 2002 – Borrowers’ Woes

Many instances have come to light about borrowers’ woes particularly belonging to SME sector and who are languishing because of callous and apathetic treatment being faced by them in violation of the rules and laws of SARFAESI Act by the Authorised Officer of the bank and some of the Presiding Officers at DRT.

Section 28 and Section 29 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 stipulates the penalties to be imposed in for non compliance of Reserve Bank of India directions and contravention or abetting the provisions of SARFAESI ACT respectively. Section 28 states, “Penalties for non-compliance of direction of Reserve Bank. –if any Securitization company or reconstruction company fails to comply with any direction issued by Reserve Bank [under section 12 or section 12(A)], such company and every officer of the company who is in default, shall be punishable with fine which may extend to five lakh rupees and in case of continuing offence, with an additional fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees for every day during which the default continues.”

Section 29 stipulates, “If any person contravenes or attempts or abets the contravention of the provisions of this Act or of any rules made thereunder, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.”  But in practice, the aforesaid provisions of the act are neither taken in to consideration by the Authorized Officer of the Bank nor taken cognizance by the Presiding Officer at DRT even when sufficient evidences are produced by the borrower for non compliance of RBI directions and contravening or abetting the rules of SARFAESI Act.

The Law of evidence plays a pivotal role in the effective functioning of the judicial system. “The existence of substantive rights can only be established by relevant and admissible evidence.” Relevancy of facts is the key to determine the outcome of the judicial process which is based on fair trial without fear or favour and upholding the principles of Natural Justice, Fundamental Rights as enshrined in the Constitution of India and Human Rights. Hence the importance of evidence neither be overlooked nor be ignored. The proof of evidence comes out of documents and the establishment of relevant evidence is through the verification of documents. Hence the documents and verification of documents are very important and very essential to establish the truth and to bring Justice. Section 3; Indian Evidence Act defines evidence as under:

“Evidence means and includes-
(a) All statements which the court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses, in relation to matters of facts under inquiry, such statements are called oral evidence;
(b) All documents including electronic records produced for the inspection of the court; such documents are called documentary evidence.”
Besides, Article 141 of The Constitution of India states,” The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be biding on all courts within the territory of India.’ DRT is also akin to a civil court. This has been elaborated under section 22 (2) and (3) of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993. Further, Section 17(7) of SARFAESI ACT also states about the disposal of application in accordance with the provisions of RDDB ACT1993 (51 of 1993) and the rules made thereafter. In this connection the following two Supreme Court judgments regarding withholding of documents are worth recalling. The first is Supreme Court judgment under Civil Appeal No. 994 of 1972, D/-27-10-1993 is referred to wherein the judgment states, (Quote) “Civil P.C. (5 of 1908), S.2 (2) – Evidence Act (1 of 1872), S.44- Proceeding in court – Fraud by litigant – Withholding of vital document relevant to litigation – It is fraud on Court – Guilty party is liable to be thrown out at any stage” (Unquote).and the second is the leading judgment by Hon’ble Supreme Court on discovery of documents vide citation AIR 1972 SC 2379, H.L. Sethi vs. R.P. Kapur vide extract of Para 6 reproduced below stated:-

“It is sufficient if the documents would be relevant for the purpose of throwing light on the matter in controversy. Every document which will throw any light on the case is a document relating to a matter in dispute in the proceedings, though it might not be admissible in evidence. In other words, a document might be inadmissible in evidence yet it may contain information which may either directly or indirectly enable the party seeking discovery either to advance his case or damage the adversary’s case or which may lead to a trial of enquiry which may have either of these two consequences.”  In spite of the citations of Supreme Court judgments, the Presiding Officer in many cases neither instructs the bank to produce the relevant material documents nor permit the cross examination of bank officials and the Authorized Officer of the bank  does not consider such citations and simply overlook them.
Yet another aspect is that when the borrower applicant submits his claim for loss and damages incurred due to many wrong doings of the bank, such claims are straight away rejected by the Authorized Officer of the bank and the Presiding Officer at DRT stating that SARFAESI ACT does not have any rule for claiming loss and damages which they categorize as “counter claim”. But the applicant borrower does not submit a counter claim as allowed under section 19(8) of DRT Act, 1993, he is claiming loss and damages under Law of Torts. This again is overlooked by the Authorized Officer and the Presiding Officer. In most of the cases the claim of loss and damages by the borrower under his application is much more than that of the demand of the Bank and hence a “No Debt Due” situation arises which should be adjudicated first before proceeding further.
In the well known Mardia Chemical judgment, the Supreme Court observed “Liquidity of finances and flow of money is essential for any healthy and growth oriented economy. But certainly, what must be kept in mind is that the law should not be in derogation of the rights which are guaranteed to the people under the Constitution. The procedure should also be fair, reasonable and valid, though it may vary looking to the different situations needed to be tackled and object sought to be achieved.” Besides, “In the background we have indicated above, we may consider as to what forums or remedies are available to the borrower to ventilate his grievance. The purpose of serving a notice upon the borrower under sub -Section 13 of the Act is, that a reply may be submitted by the borrower explaining the reasons as to why measures may or may not be taken under sub-section (4) of Section 13 in case of non- compliance of notice within 60 days. The creditor must apply its mind to the objections raised in reply to such notice and an internal mechanism must be particularly evolved to consider such objections raised in the reply to the notice. There may be some meaningful consideration of the objections raised rather than to ritually reject them and proceed to take drastic measures under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act,” Invariably the Authorized Officer of the bank simply rejects the representation and objections raised by the borrower as a matter of ritual without the application of the mind and in derogation of the rights which are guaranteed to the people under the Constitution. The Presiding Officer also follows the same practice of not minding what is stated in the application filed by the borrower by way of his S.A. and clearly favouring the Bank.
It is again observed that when review application is submitted by the borrower applicant against the order of Presiding Officer, the same is not allowed in many cases stating that there is no provision in the SARFAESI ACT for a review of the order already passed overlooking Section 17(7) of SARFAESI ACT 2002 and The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 order XLVII – Review. Further, Section 5A (1) (2) (3) of RDDB Act 1993 also narrates the rules about Review application. It must be remembered that Violation of law declared by the Supreme Court amounts to ‘Error Apparent on Face of Records’ and hence such orders of the DRTs become amenable to correction by way of Review. It may also be noted that in the light of the contentions of the Supreme Court in the matter of Mardia Chemicals, no deposit is required once the court fee is paid with the application u/s 17 of the Act.
In the ultimate analysis, if the Authorized Officer of the Bank and the Presiding Officer of DRTs adhered to the system and procedures as enshrined in the various laws of the land and conduct themselves accordingly, then only the borrower applicants in the SARFAESI cases can fulfill their expectations of upholding their Fundamental rights, respect for the Principles of Natural Justice and Human rights.  In this connection the observance of Supreme Court in the matter of Smt. Swaran Lata Ghosh, Appellant v. Harendra Kumar Banerjee and another (AIR 1969 Supreme Court 1107 V 56 C 215) is worth recalling. “Trial of a civil dispute in Court is intended to achieve, according to law and the procedure of the court, a judicial determination between the contesting parties of the matter in controversy. Opportunity to the parties interested in the dispute to present their respective cases on questions of law as well as practice, ascertainment of facts by means of evidence tendered by the parties, and adjudication by a reasoned judgment of the dispute upon a finding on the facts in controversy and application of the law to the facts found, are essential attributes of a judicial trial. In a judicial trail the judge not only must reach a conclusion which he regards as just, but, unless otherwise permitted, by the practice of the court or by law, he must record the ultimate mental process leading from the dispute to its solution. A judicial determination of a disputed claim where substantial questions of law or fact arise is satisfactorily reached, only if it be supported by the most cogent reasons that suggest themselves to the judge ; a mere order deciding the matter in dispute not supported by reasons is no judgment at all.  Recording of reasons in support of a decision of a disputed claim serves more purposes than one. It is intended to ensure that the decision is not the result of whim or fancy, but of a judicial approach to the matter in contest; it is also intended to ensure adjudication of the matter according to law and the procedure established by law. A party to the dispute is ordinarily entitled to know the grounds on which the Court has decided against him, and more so, when the judgment is subject to appeal. The Appellate Court will then have adequate material on which it may determine whether the facts are properly ascertained, the law has been correctly applied and the resultant decision is just.” It further states, “The function of a judicial trial is to hear and decide a matter in contest between the parties in open Court in the presence of parties. According to the procedure prescribed for investigation of the dispute, and the rules of evidence. The conclusion of the Court ought normally to be supported by reasons duly recorded. The requirement transcends all technical rules of procedure.”
The only way the borrower can tackle such a prevailing situation is to organize the aggrieved borrowers to enforce their right to be heard by the Presiding Officer by strictly following the established laws and practice failing which to take up the matter with higher Court by exposing the misdeeds of the Presiding Officer and the Authorized Officer so as to enable them to seek justice. “There may be times when we are powerless to prevent injustice, but there must never be a time when we fail to protest.”

Getting relief from DRT under SARFAESI Act, 2002?

It would be clueless for the professionals at times in answering the queries of the borrowers facing proceedings under ‘The Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002’. If the Bank initiates proceedings under the provisions of SARFAESI Act, 2002, then, in view of section 34, no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or legal proceeding in respect of the same subject matter.  Though there can not be any such restriction in any act when it comes to High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution of India, the High Courts too may hesitate to look into the infirmities committed by the Bank under SARFAESI Act, 2002 and the Court may lay emphasis on the availability of ‘alternative remedy’ to the borrowers under section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002.  Section 34 of the Act is as follows:

“34. Civil Court not to have jurisdiction.- No civil court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which a Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal is empowered by or under this Act to determine and no injunction shall be granted by any court other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this Act or under the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (51 of 1993).”

Relief before DRT under section 17:

Initially, it is held by the Courts and followed by the Debt Recovery Tribunals that the Tribunal, under section 17, can only see as to whether there is any procedural irregularity in the action initiated by the Bank.  However, now, it is settled, atleast as a legal principle, that the Debt Recovery Tribunal can look into all allegations or issues while entertaining an Appeal under section 17 and it extends to the issue of looking at the correctness of the amount/outstanding amount demanded by the Bank in its notice under section 13 (2). Courts have further held that the DRT has the power to restore the possession of the ‘secured asset’ back to the borrowers in appropriate cases.  It all may appear good as a principle of law, but, the reality is different. If the borrower files any appeal under section 17, then, the DRT will look at the outstanding amount in the notice under section 13 (2) and insists for the deposit of 20 or 30% of the outstanding before granting any interim relief and this interim relief can only be for some time or till the disposal of the Appeal in some cases.  It is alleged that the DRT emphasis on the amount demanded by the Bank rather the grievance of the borrower or borrowers.

What if borrower succeeds?

Again, even if borrower succeeds in his Appeal under section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, the borrower may not be happy. It is interesting. Because, the borrower might have clearly alleged or established that the Bank was at fault in adhering to the terms and conditions of the sanction and might have wanted the DRT to force the Bank to act upon the agreed terms. But, it will not happen and the DRT may simply set-aside the possession notice issued by the Bank under section 13 (4) of the Act and the Bank impliedly have an opportunity to start the proceedings afresh. There may not be any difficulty for a Public Sector Bank or the officers of the Bank to initiate proceedings against the borrower again and again.  Like-wise, on some technical grounds, the borrower may succeed in his Appeal under section 17 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, but, it would be interesting to understand as to what that means. That may be nothing at times unless the borrower is interested only in getting some time to repay the outstanding amount. It is felt that the Debt Recovery Tribunal can grant no relief to the borrowers under section 17 except asking the Bank to start the proceedings afresh.


High Court/Civil Court’s jurisdiction:

In view of the Bar under section 34 of SARFAESI Act, 2002 and in view of the composition of Tribunal, the Tribunal should have all powers to adjudicate the claim and to issue suitable directions to the Bank or suitable relief to the borrowers.  The High Court can be issuing various directions to the Bank in a SARFAESI proceeding if it chooses to entertain any Writ Petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India.  Why can’t it be done by the Tribunal also? In view of the settled practice, as many say, before the Debt Recovery Tribunals and in view of the fact that the borrower needs a forum to agitate his grievance, it is impossible according to me to say that ‘no civil court shall have jurisdiction’ or impossible to confine the jurisdiction of Civil Court in cases only when there exists ‘fraud’ etc. Civil Court shall have jurisdiction in deciding disputes between the Bank and the borrower unless there exists an ‘Arbitration Clause’. Just because, the Bank initiates the proceedings under the provisions of SARFAESI Act, 2002, it can not be a Bar on the Civil Court or the High Court under Article 226 and it all depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case.

Why there can’t be suitable compensation:

There exists a provision in the SARFAESI Act, 2002 that the borrower should be compensated if it is proved that the Bank is at fault in a proceeding under the provisions of SARFAESI Act, 2002. While section 19 of the Act deals with the issue of payment of costs and compensation to the borrowers; section 32 of the Act protects the action taken in good faith.  Section 19 and section 32 of the Act are as follows:

19. Right of borrower to receive compensation and costs in certain cases. – If the Debt Recovery Tribunal or the Court of District Judge, on an application made under section 17 of section 17A or the Appellate Tribunal or the High Court on an appeal preferred under section 18 or section 18A, holds that the possession of secured assets by the secured creditor is not in accordance with the provisions of this Act and rules made thereunder and directs the secured creditors to return such secured assets to the concerned borrowers, such borrower shall be entitled to the payment of such compensation and costs as may be determined by such Tribunal or Court of District Judge or Appellate Tribunal or the High Court referred to in section 18B.

32. Protection of Action taken in Good Faith- No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against any secured creditor or any of his officers or manager exercising any of the rights of the secured creditors or borrower for anything done or omitted to be done in good faith under this Act.

When there exists a fault on the part of the Bank, the borrower should suitably be compensated under section 19, but, in reality, it is not happening and it should happen.

Courts to the rescue of borrowers: 

While resisting to entertain the Writ Petitions under Article 226 and 227 in respect of SARFAESI matters as many believe, the Courts have always tried to make the proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunal meaningful. The Courts made it clear that the Bank should apply its mind in disposing of the objections raised by the borrower under section 13 (3). The Courts have held that the DRT has all powers under section 17 and the DRT can entertain appeals challenging any proceeding of the Bank pursuant to the issuance of notice under section 13 (4) of the Act. Thus, Courts have done its best to make the Debt Recovery Tribunals really effective.

Thursday, 27 June 2013

Tax Planning On Sale of House Property.

“Penny  Saved is the  Penny earned”.
Whenever a person sells any property, he has to pay income tax on the gain he earned.  This gain is the difference between the sale price of the property and the purchase price of the property.
As we see the property rates have multiplied in recent years, this will result in big amount of capital gain and the person will have to pay income tax on this capital gain.
Here, we are discussing few tax provisions which may be helpful to understand the taxability on sale of property and its planning for taxes.
  If the property kept for more than 36 months and than sold then  profit earned would be termed as long term capital gain.
  If the property sold within  36 months from the date of purchase than it would be termed as short term capital gain.
  Tax liability In the short term capital gain would be as per normal income tax rates under income tax Act.
  Tax liability in long term capital gain would be at the rate of 20%.
However this can be reduced through various means such as :   
Benefit of cost inflation index (CII).
-          Investment in to other residential property.
Mode of computation of Capital Gain :
       The income chargeable under the head “Capital gains” shall be computed, by deducting from the full value of the consideration received or accruing as a result of the transfer of the capital asset the following amounts, namely :
(i) Expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with such transfer;
(ii) The cost of acquisition of the asset and the cost of any improvement thereto :
 For example:
House purchased in year 2008-09 for Rs. 15 Lacs
Sold during year 2009-10 for Rs. 20 Lacs
Then Capital gain (Short term capital gain) is Rs. 5 Lacs ( 20 – 15 Lacs)
However, in case of long term capital gain, a person can get the benefit of indexation.
(iii)Indexed cost of acquisition” means an amount which bears to the cost of acquisition the same proportion as Cost Inflation Index for the year in which the asset is transferred bears to the Cost Inflation Index for the first year in which the asset was held by the assessee or for the year beginning on the 1st day of April, 1981, whichever is later;
Example with Cost Inflation Index on long term capital gain :
For example, if a property purchased in 1991-92 for Rs 10 lakh  (CII of year 199)
Being sold during 2010-11 for Rs 40 lakh, (CII of year 711)
indexed cost = (711/199) x 10 = Rs 35.72 lakh.
And the long-term capital gains would be Rs 4.27, that is Rs 40 lakh minus Rs 35.72 lakh.
(iv) “Indexed cost of any improvement” means an amount which bears to the cost of improvement the same proportion as Cost Inflation Index for the year in which the asset is transferred bears to the Cost Inflation Index for the year in which the improvement to the asset took place;
For example, if a property purchased in 1991-92 for Rs 10 lakh  (CII of year 199)
Person expended Rs. 5 lacs on improvement of property during 1997-98  (CII of year 331)
Property was sold during 2010-11 for Rs 50 lakh,  (CII of year 711)
Now, indexed cost = (711/199) x 10 = Rs 35.72 lakh. 
Further indexed cost of improvement = (711/331) x 5 = Rs 10.74 lakh 
Total inflated cost  = 35.72 + 10.74 = 46.46 Lacs            
And the long-term capital gains would be Rs 3.54, that is Rs 50 lakh minus Rs 46.46 lakh.
(v) “Cost Inflation Index” for any year means such Index as the Central Government may, having regard to seventy-five per cent of average rise in the Consumer Price Index for urban non-manual employees for that year, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify 759 in this behalf.  This concept is introduced to provide benefit of inflation to the assessee.
Individual or a Hindu undivided family have following exemption from long term capital gain under section 54 of Income Tax act :
      If the long Term capital gain invested  within a period of one year before or two years after the date on which the transfer took place purchased another residential house property
      Or ,  within a period of three years after that date constructed, a residential house, then, instead of the capital gain being charged to income-tax as income of the previous year in which the transfer took place, it shall be dealt with in accordance with the following way :

-  If the amount of the capital gain is greater than the cost of the residential house so purchased or constructed the difference between the amount of the capital gain and the cost of the new asset shall be charged under section 45 as the income of the previous year;
-  If the amount of the capital gain is equal to or less than the cost of the new asset, the capital gain shall not be charged under section 45.
- Till the time the amount of Long Term Capital gain is not utilized for the same, it should be deposited under the scheme of Long term Capital gain.
Thus by knowing these provisions an assessee can save Capital Gains Tax substantially.

How to read an agreement.

1. Introduction
From time immemorial, the commercial world has worked on contracts and agreements. The only difference between then and now, is that earlier a lot of these agreements were oral in nature, whereas nowadays, most businesses, if not all, prefer a binding written agreement. An agreement may be entered into for the smallest of matters to the largest of issues. Agreements in India are governed by the Indian Contract Act and in addition by specific statutes depending upon the nature of the agreements. For instance, an agreement to assign a copyright must bear in mind the provisions of the Copyright Act, 1957. In addition, certain taxing statutes, such as the Stamp Act, contain certain provisions which must be borne in mind while executing the agreement. It is interesting to note that there is no specific format for an agreement. There are various ways in which an agreement can be drafted. The American style of drafting is substantially different from the English style. However, it is important that it contains the vital provisions or else the purpose behind the agreement would be defeated. This Chapter looks at some of the important parts of an agreement.
2. Standard Clauses
2.1.Name Clause
This is the first part and contains the names and addresses of the parties to the agreement. It also specifies whether the agreement includes the heirs, assigns, executors, successors, administrators, etc., of the parties to the agreement. In case there is no provision for an assignment then it would be difficult for any party to do so. This clause also contains the Date of the Agreement when it is executed.
2.2.Recitals
The recitals give a brief background about the agreement. They explain the purpose behind the agreement and the objectives which it seeks to achieve. In case of property conveyancing documents, the recitals also contain a brief title history of the property. The recitals are an integral part of the document and should be carefully drafted so that it becomes easy to construe the agreement.
2.3.Representations and Warranties
This is a very important clause and due care and precaution is required while drafting the same. The parties give out certain representations and warranties in this clause and hence, if they turn out to be false then the other party has a right of action against the party making such false statements. For instance in a flat sale agreement, the flat seller can give a representation that he has not sold or mortgaged the flat to any other party and if there is a claim to the contrary, then he would indemnify the flat purchaser. This clause is also very significant in a Shareholders’ Agreement or a Joint Venture Agreement.
2.4.Prior Permissions and Approvals
Quite often, it may happen that a particular agreement is subject to prior permission from Governmental authorities. In this case, the agreement must clearly mention its conditional nature or else it may be a cause for action. For instance, a share subscription agreement which requires the prior FIPB / RBI permission must clearly state so. In the event the permission is refused then the agreement would terminate.
2.5.Costs and Charges
This Clause mentions who would bear various expenses, professional fees, etc. pertaining to and incidental to the agreement. This may also include the stamp duty cost in case of a transaction pertaining to an immovable property. It is always a good practice to have a clear understanding on this front so as to avoid disputes later on.
2.6.Notice
This clause lays down the address and contact details of the parties in case any notice, demand or other communication is to be delivered to them by any of the parties to the agreement. It provides complete postal address, telephone, fax, etc. Emails as a form of notices are frowned upon by many people and hence, not included.
2.7.Arbitration
In this Clause, the parties agree that all the disputes between them shall be amicably settled. In the event of failure to do so, the same shall be settled by an arbitration, and the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 shall apply. This is a very vital part as in its absence all disputes would go to Court and that would be a long drawn out process.
The clause normally provides the place of arbitration and the language of the proceedings. It also mentions that all arbitral awards given in respect of disputes referred to arbitration in accordance with the provisions of this Clause shall be final and binding on all parties concerned
The importance of drafting this clause carefully in case of international contracts cannot be overstressed.
2.8.Variation
Variation to the agreement shall be binding on any of the parties only if and to the extent, such variation is recorded in a written document executed between the parties.
2.9.Confidentiality
Several agreements, such as joint venture agreements, share purchase agreements, etc., contain a Confidentiality Clause. It provides that the parties would not disclose any information to a third person unless there are circumstances such as statutory requirements, etc. In certain highly sensitive agreements it is also provided that the leakage of information may be taken as a ground for termination of the agreement.
2.10.Force Majeure
“Man proposes and Nature Disposes”. The best of intentions and actions are sometimes undone by acts of God or forces of nature. These include, but are not limited to any Act of God, strike, lockout, labour dispute, epidemic, cyclone, flood, earthquake, drought, fire, explosion, atmospheric disaster, war, riot, revolution, etc. In times like these, it becomes impossible to perform one’s obligations under an agreement. Hence, the Force Majeure Clause provides that no party shall be liable for any default or delay in the performance of his obligations when such default or delay is due to any contingency beyond his reasonable control.
2.11.Schedules
These are the Schedules, if any, which have to be annexed to the agreement. For instance, in a conveyancing document, it would contain the description of the property being conveyed along with a property map. Schedules are also a part and parcel of the agreement and are as important as the main agreement.
2.12.Signature Clause
This is the Clause where the parties to the agreement sign. Each person signs in the presence of a witness. The witness need not know the contents of the agreement. All he has to certify is that the person signing has done so in his presence. There can be one witness for all signatories. The capacity in which a person is signing must be mentioned in case he is doing so for and on behalf of someone else, e.g., the Director of a Company, Partner of a Firm, Guardian of a minor, etc. In addition to signing in the Signature Clause, normally, each page is also initialled as a mark of identification.
3. Novel Clauses
3.1.Transaction Clause
This is the heart of the Agreement as it deals with the Transaction contemplated therein. For instance, in a Share Purchase Agreement, this Clause would lay down that the seller is interested in selling certain number of shares and the buyer is interested in purchasing them It would also lay down any conditions precedent which must be fulfilled by either party for the successful completion of the transaction. This Clause requires the utmost scrutiny and care while drafting.
3.2.Consideration Clause
One of the important tenets of Contract Law is that “No Consideration, No Contract”. A contract without any consideration is void ab initio except in certain cases. This Clause mentions the consideration payable in respect of the obligations of the party and should carefully scrutinised since it creates obligations for either party. Thus, in case of a share purchase agreement, the consideration clause would mention the price per share and the aggregate consideration. It would also mention the mode and the time of discharge of the consideration.
3.3.Escrow Mechanism
Certain agreements provide for an Escrow Mechanism with a reputed person, e.g., a commonly accepted solicitor or a CA. The Escrow Holder would retain in his custody the payment or documents due to the other party until such party fulfills his part of the obligations. For instance, in case of the sale of a property which is the subject matter of a mortgage, the buyer may deposit the consideration in Escrow till such time as the Seller clears the mortgage. As soon as the mortgage is redeemed, the Escrow Holder would hand over the consideration to the Seller. The events under which the Escrow Holder would release the Escrow should be very clearly specified in unambiguous terms. Escrow Mechanisms are increasingly used in agreements and are a common feature in agreements for complex infrastructure / power projects.
4. Director’s Responsibility
4.1.As agreements are the basis on which a company functions, it is imperative that they are properly drafted and safeguard the company’s interests. If the agreements suffer from some infirmity or legal handicap, then the company may have to incur severe losses. Hence, Directors must be extremely careful and cautious in all such matters. The best way to ensure this is to entrust the task to competent professionals wherever possible. The old adage better safe then sorry should always be borne in mind.
5. Auditor’s Duty
5.1.This is one area where the Auditor can make substantial value addition. As an Auditor one comes across several agreements which the auditee would enter into the course of business. The Auditor would refer to many of these agreements during his audit. He may check these agreements and advise the auditee whether those contracts are legally valid or do they suffer from some patent infirmity due to which the entity may suffer heavily. All agreements, have economic implications, which if material, impact the true and fair view.
5.2.Even otherwise than as an Auditor, a Chartered Accountant can render tremendous services in this area. If Chartered Accountants have a basic knowledge of the important provisions of the Act, they would be able to contribute towards pointing out gross errors or inadequacies in contracts entered into by their clients. This in itself would be a big service to the clients.
5.3.By broadening his peripheral knowledge, the Auditor can make intelligent enquiries and thereby add value to his services. He can caution the auditee of likely unpleasant consequences which might arise. It needs to be repeated and noted that the audit is basically under the relevant law applicable to an entity and an auditor is not an expert on all laws relevant to business operations of an entity. All that is required of him is exercise of ‘due care’.

Reasons in support of decisions making

In England the position at common law is that there is no requirement that reasons should be given for its decision by the administrative authority1. There are, however, observations in some of the Judgments wherein the importance of reasons has been emphasized. In a case, Lord Denning observed that:

“The giving of reasons is one of the fundamentals of good administration.”

Sir John Donaldson observed that failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. And Lord Lane4 Chief Justice while expressing his reservation on the proposition that any failure to give reasons means a denial of justice, observed that:

“A party appearing before a tribunal is entitled to know either expressly stated by the tribunal or inferentially stated, what it is to which the tribunal is addressing its mind.”

The Committee on Minister’s powers in its report submitted in 1932, recommended that “Any party affected by a decision should be informed of the reasons on which the decision is based” and that “such a decision should be in the form of a reasoned document available to the parities affected.”

The Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Inquiries (Franks Committee) has observed that:

“Almost all witnesses have advocated the giving of reasoned decisions by tribunals. We are convinced that if tribunal proceedings are to be fair to the citizen reasons should be given to the fullest practicable extent. A decision is apt to be better if the reasons for it have to be set out in waiting because the reasons are then more likely to have been properly thought out. Further, a reasoned decision is essential in order that, where there is a right of appeal, the applicant can assess whether he has good grounds of appeal and know the case he will have to meet if he decides to appeal.”

The recommendations of the Donoughmore Committee and the Franks Committee led to the enactment of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act, 1958 in the United Kingdom. Section 12 of that Act prescribed that it shall be the duty of the tribunal or Minister to furnish a statement, either written or oral, of the reasons for the decision if requested, on or before the giving of notification of the decision to support the decision. The said Act has been replaced by the Tribunals and Inquiries Act, 1971 which contains a similar provision in section 12. This requirement is, however, confined, in its applications to tribunals and statutory authorities specialized in Schedule I to the said enactment. In respect of the Tribunals and authorities that are not covered by the aforesaid enactment, the position, as prevails at common law, applies. The Committee of Justice in its report, administration under Law, submitted in 1971, expressed the view that:

“No single factor has inhibited the development of English administrative law as seriously as the absence of any general obligation upon public authorities to give reasons for their decisions.”

In United States the Courts have insisted upon recording reasons form the viewpoint of fairness in administrative decisions and in fact the administrative authorities are obliged to do so. The Law in Canada appears to be the same as in England. Lord Denning in Breen’s case (supra) said that the administrative law is now firmly developed in England and thereafter observed that giving of reasons is fundamental of good administration. In England there is no general rule, however, that reasons are always necessary in administrative decision making, and not treated as part of the principles of natural justice. (Position appears to have been changed after reform and report)

Position in India is on stronger footing in view of charter of fairness encrypted under Article 14 of the Constitution. India has accepted that giving of reasons represents the substance and essence of principles of natural justice and is thus treated as part of principles of natural justice. It can definitely argued that the reasons is the link between the material on record and the actual mental process of the adjudicating authority that can establish the rationale as to how the adjudicating authority has applied his mind in given set of facts and circumstances of the case.

It would be very profitable to quote the Judgement of the Supreme Court6 at this stage where it was stated that:

“The absence of arbitrary power is the first essential rule of law upon which our whole constitutional system is based. In a system governed by rule of law, discretion when conferred upon executive authorities must be confined within clearly defined limits.. the decision should be predictable one.”

The person has a right to know the reasons when he is adversely affected in terms of purse, property or liberty. If the basis for reasoned decisions are not formulated, then it is more a case of judiciary being deprived to screen the mental eventualities of executives who might have otherwise acted arbitrarily.

Gujarat High Court in Pirbhai Janubhai observed that: (Scrapped decision)

“… neither principle nor authority requires that a quasi judicial body giving its decision must give reasons in support of the decision (!). The only qualification to this rule is where an appeal is provided against the decision of the quasi-judicial body. In such a case the necessity of giving reasons in support of the decision is imposed because unless reasons are given, it would not be possible for the appellate authority to examine the correctness of the decision. But apart from such case, there is no obligation on a quasi judicial body to give reasons in support of the decision arrived at by it so long as the decision is reached after observing the principles of natural justice.”

While the aforesaid decision was given by the Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court, the case of Bhagat Raja that shall be referred to hereafter was pending for judicial determination before the Supreme Court of India and in the meanwhile a reference was made to the larger Bench of the Gujarat High Court in view of the aforesaid decision rendered by his Lordship Justice P. N. Bhagwati and the decision in Special Civil Application No. 638 of 1965 decided on 7th of September, 1965 (Gujarat High Court) as to whether a conciliation officer, who is exercising quasi judicial functions is as such amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and is bound to make a speaking order or, in other words, he must give reasons in the order.

Correcting earlier judgment9 in view of the Supreme Court Judgements Chief Justice P. N. Bhagwati observed on behalf of larger Bench that:

“Both on principle and on authority every administrative officer exercising quasi judicial functions is bound to give reasons in support of the order he makes. A conciliation Officer exercises quasi judicial function while hearing and disposing of an application by the employer under the proviso to section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act by which he seeks the approval of the Conciliation Officer for discharging its employee during the dependency of an Industrial Dispute before the said authority…”

Two factors were considered as to why quasi-judicial authority must state the reasons. It was held that:

“The necessity of giving reasons flows as a necessary corollary form the rule of law which constitutes one of the basic principles of the Indian Constitutional set-up. The administrative authorities having a duty to act judicially cannot therefore decide on considerations of policy or expediency. They must decide the matter solely on the facts of the particular case, solely on the material before them an apart from any extraneous considerations by applying pre existing legal norms to factual situations. Now necessity of giving reasons is one of the important safeguards to ensure observance of the duty to act judicially. It introduces or, at any rate, minimizes arbitrariness in the decision making process.”

Another reason was that:

“Another reason which compels making of such an order is based on the power of judicial review which is possessed by the High Court under Article 226 and the Supreme Court under 32 of the Constitution.”

The specified authority under the Act is obliged to consider the facts for giving or refusing to give the approval in connection with discharge of Industrial worker during the pendency of reference. Quasi-judicial authority, in the facts and circumstances of the case, was bound by law to render his decision supported by reasons.

The Law Commission in the 14th Report relating to form in judicial administration suggested that:

“In the case of administrative decisions provisions should be made that they should be accompanied by reasons. The reasons will make it possible to test the validity of these decisions by the machinery of appropriate writs.”

The Law Commission suggested remedying the loopholes, but unfortunately no general duty so far has been created to furnish the reasons in support of administrative decision making. In some of the Judgements, the question as to whether the adjudicating authority is expected to support his decision by reasons was not very effectively answered, but the dividing line between the quasi judicial action and administrative action was considered by the Supreme Court. Ridge V/s Baldwin rendered valuable assistance that the Supreme Court respectfully accepted.

In case of Harinagar Sugar Mills Case10 the Court observed that:

“If the Central Government acts as a tribunal exercising judicial powers and the exercise of that power is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution we fail to see how the power of this court can be effectively exercised if reasons are not given by the Central Government in support of its order.”

Safeguarding the interest of the Citizens in a Welfare State, the Supreme Court in Madhya Pradesh Industries11 observed that:

“In the context of a welfare State, administrative tribunals have come to stay. Indeed they are the necessary concomitants of a welfare State. But arbitrariness in their functioning destroys the concept of a Welfare State itself. Self-discipline and supervision exclude or at any rate minimize arbitrariness. The least a tribunal can do is to disclose its mind. The compulsion of disclosure guarantees consideration. The condition to give reasons introduces clarity an excludes or at any rate minimizes arbitrariness, it gives satisfaction to the party against whom the order is made, and it also enables and appellate or supervisory court to keep the tribunals within bounds. A reasoned order is a desirable condition of judicial disposal.”

It was further observed that:

“If tribunals can make orders without giving reasons, the said powers in the hands of unscrupulous or dishonest officers may turn out to be a potent weapon for abuse of power. But, if reasons for an order are to be given, it will be an effective restraint on such abuse, as the order, if it discloses extraneous or irrelevant considerations will be subject to judicial scrutiny and correction. A speaking order will at its best be a reasonable and at its worst be atleast plausible one. The public should not be deprived of this only safeguard.”

Sometimes, the adjudicating authority passes an order in the proceedings that would be subject to appeal and the question would be whether the appellate or revisional authority affirming the order in appeal or revision without a speaking order is sustainable in law. The appellate or revisional authority in many cases disposes of the proceedings in one word “dismissed” or rejected, but this practice would be unreasonable. The Supreme Court in Bhagat Raja held such practice to be completely unsatisfactory.

In Mahavir Prasad Santoshkumar13 the Supreme Court observed that:

“The practice of the executive authority dismissing statutory appeal against orders which prima facie seriously prejudice the rights of the aggrieved party without giving reasons is a negation of the rule of law.”

The Supreme Court further observed that:

“Recording of reasons in support of a decision on a disputed claim by a quasi judicial authority ensures that the decision is reached according to law and is not the result of a caprice, whim or fancy or reached on gourds of policy or expediency. A party to the dispute is ordinarily entitled to know the grounds on which the authority has rejected his claim. If the order is subject to appeal, the necessity to record reasons is greater, for without recorded reasons the appellate authority has no material on which it may determine whether the facts were properly ascertained, the relevant law was correctly applied and the decision was just.”

In this case the District Magistrate had cancelled the license granted under the Licensing Order, without giving any reasons and the State Government also dismissed the appeal without recording the reasons in support thereof. The Court in this case tresses the need of passing a speaking order by the original adjudicating authority and insisted that the recording of reasons assumes great importance especially when the order is made subject to appeal. Since the giving of reasons in support of decision is accepted to be part of principles of natural justice, even original administrative authority owes a duty to pass a speaking order. In woolcombers of India Limited the Supreme Court observed that:

“The giving of reasons in support of their conclusions by judicial and quasi judicial authorities when exercising initial jurisdiction is essential for various reasons. First, it is calculated to prevent unconscious, unfairness or arbitrariness in reaching the conclusions. The very search for reasons will put the authority on the alert and minimize the chances of unconscious infiltration of personal biased or unfairness in the conclusion. The authority will adduce reasons which will be regarded as fair and legitimate by a reasonable man and will discard irrelevant or extraneous considerations. Second it is a well known principle that justice should not only be done but should also appear to be done. Unreasoned conclusions may be just but they may not appear to be just to those who read them. Reasoned conclusions, on the other hand, will have also the appearance of justice. Third, it should be remembered that an appeal generally lies from the decision of judicial and quasi-judicial authorities to this Court by Special leave granted under Article 136. A Judgement which does not disclose the reasons will be of little assistance to the Court.”

Siemens Engineering & Manufacturing Company of India Ltd15completely voids the administrative attitude of the Central Government. Justice Bhagwati observed:

“If Courts of law are to be replaced by administrative authorities and tribunals, as indeed, in some kinds of cases, with the proliferation of administrative law they may have to so replaced, it is essential that administrative authorities and tribunals should accord fair and proper hearing to the persons sought to be affected by their decisions and give sufficiently clear and explicit reasons in support of the orders made by them. Then alone administrative authorities and tribunals, exercising quasi-judicial functions will be able to justify their existence and carry credibility with the people by inspiring confidence in the adjudicatory process. The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principle of Audi alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi judicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretense of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law.”

After having pronounced this Judgement, the Central Government transferred its business to the Tribunal.

Before you file a case

There are a few essentials that help the process of filing a court case, easier. Here, a lawyer gives some tips on how to prepare for the final application to the court.
* Make all complaints in written form.
* Photocopy every paper, every document that you write, mail or send to people.
*  Whenever you submit a document to somebody, get a ‘Received’ stamped on the photostat copy.
*  File the photocopies of the originals in chronological order.
*  File the photocopies, with ‘Received’ stamped on them, again in chronological order – in a file separate from the  photocopies of the originals. This will help if you ever lose any document.
*  Keep your eyes and ears open for cases related to your case. If you hear of similar cases, note them down; if you come  across news clippings; file them (and put a photocopy in the relevant file); if you know somebody who has gone through  a similar experience or filed a similar case, talk to them. Refer them to your lawyer.
*  If dealing with the government, try to get hold of any public circulars, notifications or written regulations, which could  strengthen your case. File them and their photocopies separately.
*  If a government department is not giving you the documents or information you need, apply under the Right To  Information (RTI.) Act. This may take about a month to bear results.
*  If your case is employment-related, gather all the rules of conduct, hiring/firing regulations, employment codes, etc, of  the organization you are appealing against.