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Thursday, 27 June 2013

Critical Analysis of Inter-State Works Contract

After amendment to the constitution by inserting Article 366(29A) providing definition of the term “taxes on sale or purchase of goods” to include deemed sales, States were empowered to levy tax on sale or purchase of goods involved in execution of works contracts. However, the power of States to levy tax on deemed sales including works contract sales are subject to restrictions contained in Article 286 of the Constitution of India. Under Article 286 State has no power to levy tax on –
i) sale or purchase of goods effected in the course of inter-State trade or commerce,
ii) sale or purchase of goods effected in the course of export,
iii) sale or purchase of goods effected in the course of import and
iv) sale or purchase of goods effected outside the State.
Further, power of States to levy tax on sale or purchase of goods of special importance, in the course of inter-State trade and commerce is subject to further restrictions as may be prescribed by the Parliament.
The Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) provides for levy of tax on inter-State sales as well as determines rules when any sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to be effected in thecourse of inter-State trade or commerce, import or export and outside the State. It also provides the list of goods of special importance and contains restrictions on power of States to levy tax on sale or purchase of such declared goods.
The SC in case of Gannon and Dunkerley 73 STC 373, as also later in 88 STC 204 held for the first time that power of States to levy tax on deemed sale or purchase of goods is subject to restrictions provided in Article 286. Accordingly, States have no power to levy tax on deemed sale or purchase of goods effected in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, import, export or effected outside the State. Although CST Act was not amended, the provisions of CST Act determining;–
– situs of sale,
– when sale or purchase of goods is deemed to be effected in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, and
– when sale or purchase of goods is deemed to be effected in the course of import or export shall apply to deemed sales.
At the same time, no tax was payable under the CST Act on deemed sale of goods effected in the course of inter-State trade as the definition of sale provided in the Act did not include such deemed sales.
The Finance Act, 2002 amended CST Act, 1956, from 11-5-2002 by substituting section 2 (g), the scope of definition of the term ‘sale’ is widened. The definition of the term ‘sale’ is brought at par with definition of the term ‘Taxes on sales’ contained in Article 366(29A) of the Constitution of India.
No corresponding or consequential amendment was made in other provisions of the Act by the said Finance Act.
The definition of the term “sale price” of the CST Act was amended by the Finance Act, 2005 from 13-5-2005, whereby a proviso was inserted in section 2(h) ofthe Act. Accordingly, for works contract sales, the Central Government is given power to prescribe by way of rule to determine the sale price of goods in a prescribed manner by making such deduction from the total consideration for the workscontract as may be prescribed. Till date no such rules are prescribed.
Similarly, sub-clause (ja) is inserted in section 2 of the CST Act by Finance Act, 2005 defining the term “works contract”.
Inter-State sale-S.3
i) Section 3 of the CST Act, provides for principals to determine when a sale or purchase of goods takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce.
We have settled law and principles on provisions of section 3 of Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 to determine when sale of goods takes place in thecourse of inter-State trade or commerce. These principles have been applied by the courts in case of deemed sales like works contract and lease transactions. After the amendment to CST Act, 1956, by Finance Act, 2002, the position is very clear for application of provisions of section 3 to the deemed sales.
ii) Salient feature of inter-State sales
The salient feature of inter-State sales on the basis of rulings of various courts are as under:
1. The contract of sale occasions movement of goods from one State to another.
2. The movement of goods has occasioned under a contract of a sale.
3. The property in goods may pass in the same State. In other words it is not necessary that property in goods must pass in the other State.
4. The movement of goods may precede the sale or the movement followed by a sale.
5. There may be an express term or covenant for inter-State movement of goods in the contract itself or may be implied from the facts of the case.
6. Situs of a sale is immaterial for determining the inter-State nature of sale.
7. There must be an inextricable link between movement of the goods from one State to another and the contract of sale.
8. Inter-State stock transfer to branch against specific order or against contract of a sale, occasions inter-State movement of goods and are inter-State sale.
i) U/s 3(b) of CST Act, a sale which is effected by transfer of document of title to the goods while the goods are in transit, is also an inter-State sale.
ii) Inter-State Works Contract sales
The provisions of section 3 also apply to works contract sales. The test to determine inter-State sales depends upon inter-State movement of goods under the contract of a sale.
In case of works contract sales, inter-State movement of goods takes place of goods with which works contract is executed as well as processed goods. In both cases, a sale is deemed to have effected in the course of inter-State trade and liable to pay tax under the CST Act.
The Gauhati High Court in case of M/s Projects and Services (82 STC 89) held that when contract is undertaken by a contractor situated outside the State of Tripura and goods are brought in to the State of Tripura from the place outside the State for execution of the workscontract in the State, it is an inter-State sale.
The Punjab & Haryana High Court, in case of M/s Hindustan Thompson Printing Press (100 STC 417) held that when lottery tickets are printed in the State of Haryana and delivered to a dealer in other State then it is an inter-State sale.
The Maharashtra Tribunal in M/s. Bhandari Metal SA 1619/94 dt. 23-1-1998 (Ref. rejected on 31-3-2001) followed decision of East India Cotton Mfg. (90 STC 221) and held that when dealer in Maharashtra received goods from the other State dealer for processing and after process, the processed goods are delivered to him outside the State, then it is an inter-State sale.
Generally, for the purpose of determining inter-State sale, the inter-State movement of goods in which property is passed, is to be considered. However, for determining inter-State workscontract sales, Courts in case of Hindustan Thompson 100 STC 417 and other cases have considered the inter-State movement of processed goods also, although no property in such goods is passed.
In view of above, the inter-State works contract sale takes place when not only the contract occasions inter-State movement of goods with which contract is executed but also when it occasions inter-State movement of processed goods.
v) Sale by transfer of document of title to the goods S-3(b).
Under section 3 (b) of the Act, any sale effected by transfer of document of title to the goods while goods are in transit from one State to anothet is also an inter-State sale and exempt from payment of tax under section 6 (2) ofthe Act. The issue is whether there can be such inter-State works contract sale?
In case of works contract, the property in goods passes as and when goods are used in works contract and not on delivery of goods. Section 3 (b) of the Act provides for passing of property in goods in a particular manner; i.e., by transfer of document of title to the goods. Unless, the property in goods passes by transfer of document of title to the goods, while it is in transit from one State to another the provisions of section 3(b) and section 6(2) are not applicable.
As discussed above, in case of works contract, the property in goods does not pass by transfer of document of title to the goods but it passes as and when goods are used in works contract. Therefore, the provisions of sections 3 (b) and 6(2) do not apply to works contract sales. As such, the exemption from payment of tax cannot be claimed and tax will have to be payable on such transaction.
However in such cases, it is possible to contend that contract is not an indivisible works contract but divisible contract involving sale of goods by transfer of document of title to the goods as such exempt from payment of tax under section 6(2) of the CST Act, subject to production of required form C and E-I.
Sale in the course of import or export – Section 5
Under section 5 of the CST Act, no tax is payable on any sale or purchase of goods which occasions import of goods into India or export of goods outside India. Further any sale of goods effected by transfer of document of title to the goods before it crosses the custom frontier of India, popularly known as High seas sale, is also exempt from payment of tax under section 5(2) of the Act. Under section 5(3) of the CST Act, any sale of goods to the exports to comply terms of any pre existing export order is also exempt from payment of tax, subject to production of form H.
The provisions of section 5 apply to works contract sales also, even prior to amendment to section 2(g) of the Act from 11-5-2002. Because, the exemption under section 5 is in fact under article 286 of the Constitution and section 5 of the Act only provides rules for determining when any sale or purchase of goods shall be deemed to be effected in the course of import or export. The SC in case of Gannon and Dunkerly 73 STC 373 held that power of State to levy tax on sale or purchase of goods including deemed sales is subject to restrictions contained in article 286 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, State has no power to levy any tax on deemed sale of goods including works contract sales covered by section 5 of the Act.
The Commissioner of Sales Tax in case of Mazgaon Dockyard (DDQ dt. 31-10-1995) allowed the claim of the dealer for exemption under section 5(2) of the Act and held that when under the contract, the good are imported by the contractor under the specific terms of the contract and used in works contract then it has occasioned movement of goods from outside India and exempt under section 5(2) of the CST Act.
Levy of CST on Works Contract sales
i) After the amendment by Finance Act, 2002, by substitution of definition of ‘sale’ to include “deemed sales including works contract sales”, it is possible to levy tax under the CST Act on deemed sales taking place in the case of inter-State trade.
ii) The levy of tax is provided in section 6 of the Act. As per section 6 of the Act, every dealer from the date notified by the Government, not earlier than 30 days, is liable to pay the tax. In exercise of the power, the Government of India had issued notification No. SRO 940A dated 26-3-1957 notifying 1-7-1957 as the date from which tax was payable under the Act. Subject to provisions of section 6 (2), the tax is payable on turnover of sales at the rate of tax as per provisions of section 8 of the Act.
iii) Works Contract – Section 2(ja)
The term ‘works contract’ is defined in section 2(ja) of the Act. Accordingly, ‘works contract’ means a contract for carrying out any work which includes assembling, construction, building, altering, manufacturing, processing, fabricating, erection, installation, fitting out, improvement, repair or commissioning of any movable or immovable property. Therefore any inter-State sale of goods involved in execution of works contract as defined in section 2(ja) is liable to pay tax under the Act.
iv) Sale Price / Turnover of sales – Ss-2 (h) and (j)
The tax under the CST Act is payable on turnover of sales. The term ‘turnover of sales’ is defined in section 2(j) to mean aggregate of the sale price received or receivable for sale of the goods. The term ‘sale price’ is defined in section 2(h) to mean amount paid or payable for sale or purchase of goods etc. Pursuant to the amendment by Finance Act, 2002, no consequential amendment was made in these clauses. The Finance Act, 2005 inserted a proviso to section 2(h) giving power to the Government to prescribe manner of determination of sale price by making deductions from total consideration, as may be prescribed. Till date no such rules are prescribed.
In absence of such rules, whether CST is payable on entire contract value?
The SC in case of 2nd Gannon Dunkerley’s case 88 STC 204 held that in case of works contract, tax is payable on value of goods deemed to be sold while executing works contract. The entire contract value is not taxable. The deductions for labour and other services are to be made from total contract value for determining value of goods sold for levy of tax.
In view of above decision of SC, States have provided rules to determine sale price of goods in case of works contract sales.
The SC in case of M/s. Mahim Patram 6 VST 248 (SC) held that till Rules are prescribed by government to determine sale price of works contract sales, State rules shall be applicable to determine sale price of the goods for levy of tax under the CST Act.
Therefore, in Maharashtra, provision of rule 58 shall apply for determination of sale price for levy of CST.
v) Issue of Form C
As a result of amendment by Finance Act, 2002, the dealer can issue Form C for purchase of goods in the course of inter-State trade for the purpose of works contract sales. Prior to the amendment by administrative circular, the Commissioner of Sales Tax in Maharashtra had allowed the purchase of goods on C form to the contractor for purchase of goods which are used in works contract on which tax is paid under the earlier Works Contract Act. After the amendment to definition of “sale” to include “deemed sales”, the dealer is entitled to issue Form C as the term “sale” appearing in section 8 will also include works contract sales.
At the same time while purchasing any goods, by way of works contract which are involved in execution of works contract for use in manufacturing or processing of goods or packing of goods for sale or resale etc., the C form can be issued by the employer.
vi) Rate of tax – S.8
As per section 8 of the Act, in case of sales not supported with Form C or D the tax is payable at the rate applicable inside the appropriate State under the General Sales Tax laws. The tax will be payable at the rate of tax payable under the local Act applicable to the goods sold.
As discussed earlier, in works contract sales, tax is payable on the sale of goods which takes place as and when goods are used in works contract. Therefore, for the purpose of determination of rate of tax, the form of goods in which sale takes place is to be considered. In case of sale of goods against Form C, at present, rate of tax is 2%. In any other case, rate of tax will be local rate of tax applicable to the goods sold.
Under section 8 of the Act, sales to the SEZ or developer of SEZ, is exempt from payment of tax against Form I. This provision is applicable to works contract sales also. Accordingly, no tax is payable under the Act on inter-State works contract sales to SEZ unit or developer of SEZ against Form I.

Indo-US Nuclear Treaty – A fraud on the nation

Balasubrahmanyam  Kamarsu                                                                                                                                                  Advocate,  Suprem Court of India                                                                                                     

Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh and UPA chairperson Smt Sonia Gandhi have committed a fraud on the nation by obtruding a nuclear deal that seriously compromises India’s strategic sovereignty and right of nuclear tests. The UPA constituent parties have fully endorsed the anti-national conspiracy hatched by the Congress. The Congress led UPA government has not only mortgaged the eight decade indigenous and self reliant nuclear technology but also tried to nullify the glorious achievements by the Indian scientists in the field of nuclear science. The Singh-Sonia duo concealed all the relevant and vital issues and facts of the Indo-US agreement and approached the IAEA stealthily. The Congress and UPA leader’s assurances on assured fuel supply and transfer of technology proved to be a hoax.
The nationalist forces have been cautioning the UPA government about the adverse impacts of the Indo-US nuclear agreement. Learned persons from all walks of life – intellectuals, scientists, legal experts, professors and social activists have time and again cautioned the persons in UPA about the imminent dangers of the 123 Agreement in the present form.
Nullified Vajpayee’s legacy
Explaining the hidden threats of the 123 Agreement, the Indian intelligentsia said that this agreement in the present shape is an attempt to circumvent the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). NPT is an international treaty to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. Currently, 189 countries are party to this treaty. Five of which have nuclear weapons – United States of America, United Kingdom, France, Russia and China. India did not sign NPT alleging that the treaty creates a club of ‘nuclear haves’ and a larger group of ‘nuclear have-nots’ and the treaty never explains on what ethical grounds such a distinction is valid. CTBT bans all nuclear explosions in all environments, for military or civil purposes. CTBT has been signed by 177 countries and India is not a signatory to this treaty.
All the American interlocutors, whether belong to the Republican Party or the Democratic Party or are independent experts, have made it clear that, as far as their country is concerned, their principal objective is to bring India into the Non-Proliferation Regime. What they want fits in well with the critical stand that Dr. Manmohan Singh took after Pokharan II in 1998. Both want India to come within the Non-Proliferation Regime dicated by the US.
The Manmohan Singh Government has deliberately and knowingly did not heed to the warnings and misled the people and the Parliament of India on this deal. It is now crystal clear that India will lose the right to nuclear tests forever as a result of this 123 Agreement. This agreement seriously jeopardise the great achievements of Sri Atal Bihari Vajpayee government’s nuclear deterrence. The entire world recognized India as a nuclear weapon state following the successful conduct of Pokhran II. In May 1998, the Atal Bihari Vajpayee led NDA government conducted multiple nuclear tests and declared its nuclear capability. India successfully detonated five ‘thermo-nuclear weapons.’ On Monday 11 May 1998, India declared itself a full fledged nuclear armed State.
Besides, India confidently countered several international sanctions. The entire nation firmly stood by the Vajpayee government. India courageously fought and withstood economic sanctions imposed by major countries in the world. When India refused to succumb, these countries have lifted the sanctions unilaterally. India repudiated discriminatory non-proliferation obligations.
The UPA government headed by a weak Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh has compromised on this great legacy and hypothecated India’s interests to foreign nations. 
LIES, LIES AND LIES
The irony is that Dr Manmohan Singh and his colleagues in the cabinet, Congress president Sonia Gandhi and her associates in the party, the allied parties of the UPA indulged in perjury and concocted illogical theories to defend the 123 agreement. The greatest misery is that the Prime Minister himself indulged in issuing false and misleading statements over the past three and a half year. He lied to the people of India and Parliament that Hyde Act is not binding on 123 Agreement and India is free to conduct nuclear tests in future.
Besides earlier statements, the Prime Minister’s office on July 2, 2008 said that ”the 123 Agreement clearly overrides the Hyde Act and this position would be clear to any one who goes through the provisions.” But, the letter sent by the Bush administration to Chairman of the House on Foreign Affairs Committee on January 16, 2008, completely exposes the Government of India and the fraudulent claims it has been making about the merits of the nuclear deal. The Bush administration clearly stated that the proposed 123 Agreement is in full conformity with the Hyde Act and in the event India detonated a nuclear explosive device then the USA has the right to cease all nuclear co-operations with India immediately including the supply of fuel as well as to request the return of any items transferred from USA including fresh fuel.
United States – India Peaceful Atomic Energy Co-operation Act – popularly known as –Hyde Act is an act adopted by US Congress providing exemptions to India with regard to nuclear science. This is a domestic Act of United States of America. This Act provides legal  basis for 123 Agreement with India. United States – India Peaceful Atomic Energy Co-operation Act of 2006 is the legal framework for a bilateral pact between US and India under which the US will provide access to civilian nuclear technology and access to nuclear fuel in exchange for IAEA safeguards on civilian Indian reactors. 
Mr Jeffrey T Bergner, Assistant Secretary, Legal Affairs of United States Department of state in a letter to Tom Lontos, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives categorically stated that — “In his September 19 Statement, Assistant Secretary Boucher twice made clear that we think (the proposed 123 Agreement with India) is in full confirmity with the Hyde Act. Indeed, the Administration is confident that the proposed agreement is consistent with the legal requirements of both the Hyde Act and Atomic Energy Act. The proposed agreement satisfies the particular requirements of Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act with the exception of the requirements for full-scope safeguards, which the President is expected to exempt prior to the submission of the agreement to Congress for its approval, as provided for in section 104 of the Hyde Act. The agreement is fully consistent with the legal requirements of the Hyde Act.”
Section 106 of the Hyde Act makes the US position clear: “A determination and any waiver under Section 104 shall cease to be effective if the President determines that India has detonated a nuclear device after the date of the enactment of this Act.
What does Section 104 say: “Pursuant to the obligations of the US under Article I of the NPT, nothing in this title constitutes authority to carry out any civilian nuclear cooperation between the United States and a country that is not a nuclear weapon state party to the NPT that would in any way assist, encourage or induce the country to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.
Further, Mr Bergner stated that — “the US government will not assist India in design, construction, or cooperation of sensitive nuclear techonologies through the transfer of dual-use items, whether under the Agreement or outside the Agreement. The United States rarely transfers dual-use items for sensitive nuclear activities to any cooperating party and no such transfers are currently pending.”
It is clear now that the deal will be terminated and all supplies will be stopped the moment India goes in for nuclear tests and all materials supplied to it will have to be returned.


Devaluing the Prime Minister’s office Dr Manmohan Singh approached the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in a deceitful manner without first seeking a vote of confidence in Parliament. The draft circulated to the IAEA board members has serious long-term implications for India.

The Prime Minister and the Congress president Sonia Gandhi prevaricated that the Agreement cannot be made public as it is a classified document. The Congress leaders could bluff with the people of India and allies of the UPA but the entire world found it on internet.

The draft Safeguards Agreement has made a mockery of the assurances that Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh had repeatedly given to the nation. Speaking in the Lok Sabha on July 29, 2005, had said: “We shall undertake the same responsibilities and obligations as … the US”; “we expect the same rights and benefits” as the US; and “India will never accept discrimination”. This assurance has been flouted in the Agreement, which does not recognize India as a Nuclear Weapons State (NWS) on par with the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China.

The PM had assured that the Agreement would be “India-specific” – that is less onerous and intrusive than the Agreements with the Non-NWS. He had assured Parliament on August 17, 2006, that, “As a country with nuclear weapons, there is no question of India agreeing to a safeguards agreement or an Additional Protocol applicable to non-nuclear-weapons states of the NPT”.

Far from it being an India-specific agreement, the accord resembles IAEA agreements with non-nuclear-weapons states. With the exclusion of the first two pages that contain the preamble, and a couple of other exceptions, the text is largely modelled on IAEA safeguards agreements with non-nuclear-weapons state. As sought by the United States, the text of the India-IAEA accord has been drawn from the strengthened INFCIRC-66/Rev.2 (16 September 1968) model for NNWS.

India will have none of the rights that the five established nuclear-weapons states have vis-à-vis the IAEA. Nuclear-weapons states accept only voluntary, revocable inspections. Moreover, these five nuclear powers have the sovereign right to terminate their safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

The India-IAEA safeguards accord comes with perpetual, legally irrevocable obligations, which India cannot suspend or end, even if the supplier-states cut off supply of fuel and replacement parts. The IAEA inspections in India will not be nominal but stringent and invasive, of the type applicable to non-nuclear-weapons states.

The draft Agreement is exactly the same – word for word, para by para – as what the US Administration had wanted. India has not only accepted stringent “routine” inspections with “access at all times”, but also “Special Inspections”. Paragraph 63 of the India-IAEA accord states the “Agency may carry out special inspections if: (a) the study of a report indicates that such inspection is desirable; or (b) any unforeseen circumstance requires immediate action. The Board shall subsequently be informed of the reasons for and the results of each such inspection”.

In other words, the Agency will have the right to carry out “special inspections” if it believed any activity at a safeguarded Indian facility or any report raised questions. In the North Korean case, the board had approved the special inspections which the Pyongyang refused to allow. But India, in its accord with the IAEA, has consented to be subject to special inspections without the Board’s prior consent.

While the five established nuclear powers have offered only 11 facilities in total — less than 1% of their total facilities — for IAEA safeguards, India has agreed to place 35 of its facilities under IAEA inspection, according to the civil-military separation plan presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister in 2006.

These facilities include 14 power reactors; three heavy-water plants at Thal-Vaishet, Hazira and Tuticorin; six installations at the Nuclear Fuel Complex in Hyderabad; the PREFRE reprocessing plant at Tarapur; and nine research facilities, such as the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, Board of Radiation and Isotope Technology and Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics. In addition, the Prime Minister has agreed to shut down by 2010 the Cirus research reactor, which is one of the two research reactors in India producing weapons-grade plutonium. Several of these are generic facilities: nuclear medicine, irradiation of food grains, nuclear energy, and also nuclear weapons.

A source of grave concern for India is the fact that the so-called “Corrective Measures” in the draft Agreement, in the event of disruption of fuel supplies, are dangerously vague and non-specific. For example, the safeguards accord’s Clause 29 reads: “The termination of safeguards on items subject to this Agreement shall be implemented taking into account the provisions of GOV/1621 (20 August 1973)”. Although the text of the GOV/1621 document is not public, its central stipulation is well-known — that facility-specific safeguards shall be “in perpetuity”, allowing for no suspension of international safeguards and shutting out room for corrective measures. Such are the known conditions of GOV/1621 that the rights and obligations of the parties continue perpetually on all nuclear materials until the materials have been returned or all the fissionable material supplied, produced or processed goes out of the inventory.

Under Clause 32 of the India-IAEA accord, New Delhi can withdraw a facility from safeguards with the prior consent of the IAEA but only after “the facility is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards,” which means the installation’s nuclear capability has been dismantled or permanently disabled to the Agency’s satisfaction.

Another cause of concern is that in case of disagreement or dispute, there is no arbitration. India can only represent its case to the Board (Clauses 104 to 106), whose decision has to be implemented by us. If India does not act on its directive, the Board will report India’s non-compliance to the UN General Assembly and Security Council. Past experience has shown that India has rarely received justice when India-related disputes have gone to the UNSC.

The Prime Minister had assured Parliament on August 17, 2006, that, “As a country with nuclear weapons, there is no question of India agreeing to a safeguards agreement or an Additional Protocol applicable to non-nuclear-weapons states of the NPT”. In contrast, the “Additional Protocol” will seek to ensure that specialized equipment, trained personnel, and designs and operating manuals are not transferred from the civilian programme to the military programme. The Hyde Act demands that the “Additional Protocol” for India be “based on a Model Additional Protocol as set forth in IAEA information circular (INFCIRC) 540” — that is, the Protocol applicable to non-nuclear-weapons states.

The following are not provided at all: (a) Assured, uninterrupted fuel supply; (b) strategic reserves of fuel. In 123 Agreement, the promises for uninterrupted fuel supplies are all prospective. In August 2006, the PM had told Parliament, for instance, that: “An important assurance is the commitment of support for India’s right to build up strategic reserves of nuclear fuel over the lifetime of India’s reactors”. The Draft with IAEA carries no reference to the continuation of India’s safeguards obligations being contingent on perpetual fuel supply. The agreement indeed explicitly blocks India from ever undertaking real correction in response to a fuel supply cut-off — the lifting of  IAEA safeguards.

In fact, what was provided even in the 123 Agreement has been given the go-by. Article 5 of the 123 Agreement specified, “In the light of the above understandings with the United States, an India-specific safeguards agreement will be negotiated between India and the IAEA providing for safeguards against withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear material from civilian use at any time as well as providing for corrective measures that India may take to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies.”

Clause 3 of the IAEA draft Agreement provides: “The purpose of safeguards under this Agreement is to guard against the withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear material from civilian use at any time” Notice that the words are exactly as provided in the 123 Agreement. But the words that follow in the 123 Agreement are conspicuously missing! Similarly, no reference in operative parts to strategic reserves. Quite rightly too: it is no job of IAEA to help us build stocks of fuel – yet Government spokesmen are saying that the Agreement provides for these!

Lastly, the BJP has been demanding from the Government, right since July 2005, to know the cost of separation of military and civilian facilities. The Government has not given a reply to this important question till date.

While the Government has all along said that the deal is exclusively about nuclear energy, the US Administration and America’s bipartisan political class has left no one in doubt that the deal is all about bringing India into the non-proliferation regime.

The leadership of the Congress party and the Government  is assisting the US in realizing its most important foreign policy objective vis-à-vis India in a manner that has undermined India’s strategic autonomy while promising illusory energy security.

Disrespect for Parliament
Dr Manmohan Singh kept every thing secretive about the Nuclear Deal. He did not discuss the contents of this deal either in Parliament nor with his cabinet colleagues. There was total lack of transperancy. The irony is that the political parties and governments of the countries represented on the Board of Governors of the IAEA have an opportunity to debate the contents of the draft safeguards agreement concerning India, but the people and the political parties in India are deprived of that opportunity.
Dr. Manmohan Singh addressed a press conference in Washington on 20 July 2005, two days after he and US President George Bush issued a joint statement about the Indo-US nuclear deal. One correspondent asked Dr. Manmohan Singh a pointed question: “Mr. Prime Minister, do you see any resistance coming forward from your allies and the opposition in putting the new India-U.S. policy to practice? And will you seek a parliamentary consensus or approval to the new direction you seem to be taking in foreign policy?”
This is how the PM replied. “Well, the Parliament in our country is sovereign,” he said. “It goes without saying that we can move forward only on the basis of a broad national consensus.” If Dr. Manmohan Singh truly believes that “Parliament in our country is sovereign”, why did he not seek a sense of the two Houses before rushing into the 123 Agreement and the safeguards agreement with the IAEA? Not even one all-partmeeting was conducted on this issue. There was a consistent demand for setting up a Joint Parliamentary Committee to study the 123 Agreement. Dr Singh did not accept the demand. Probably the Prime Minister must have thought that the MP s are incapable of giving considered opinion on the issue.
Accountability and transparency are the cornerstones of democratic system of governance. These have been casualties in the functioning of the UPA government. This is best illustrated by the manner in which the government has handled the issue of the Indo-US nuclear deal. Ideally in a democracy, any major international agreement that impinges on India’s national unity, territorial integrity and security must be ratified by Parliament.The Prime Minister has reduced an important agreement between two sovereign nations into a private agreement between two individuals — himself and President Bush. He has behaved as a junior partner in this partnership.
                         (Authour is BJP national Media Co-Convener based in New Delhi)
Balasubrahmanyam  Kamarsu                                                                                                                                                  Advocate,  Suprem Court of India                                                                                                     

Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh and UPA chairperson Smt Sonia Gandhi have committed a fraud on the nation by obtruding a nuclear deal that seriously compromises India’s strategic sovereignty and right of nuclear tests. The UPA constituent parties have fully endorsed the anti-national conspiracy hatched by the Congress. The Congress led UPA government has not only mortgaged the eight decade indigenous and self reliant nuclear technology but also tried to nullify the glorious achievements by the Indian scientists in the field of nuclear science. The Singh-Sonia duo concealed all the relevant and vital issues and facts of the Indo-US agreement and approached the IAEA stealthily. The Congress and UPA leader’s assurances on assured fuel supply and transfer of technology proved to be a hoax.
The nationalist forces have been cautioning the UPA government about the adverse impacts of the Indo-US nuclear agreement. Learned persons from all walks of life – intellectuals, scientists, legal experts, professors and social activists have time and again cautioned the persons in UPA about the imminent dangers of the 123 Agreement in the present form.
Nullified Vajpayee’s legacy
Explaining the hidden threats of the 123 Agreement, the Indian intelligentsia said that this agreement in the present shape is an attempt to circumvent the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). NPT is an international treaty to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. Currently, 189 countries are party to this treaty. Five of which have nuclear weapons – United States of America, United Kingdom, France, Russia and China. India did not sign NPT alleging that the treaty creates a club of ‘nuclear haves’ and a larger group of ‘nuclear have-nots’ and the treaty never explains on what ethical grounds such a distinction is valid. CTBT bans all nuclear explosions in all environments, for military or civil purposes. CTBT has been signed by 177 countries and India is not a signatory to this treaty.
All the American interlocutors, whether belong to the Republican Party or the Democratic Party or are independent experts, have made it clear that, as far as their country is concerned, their principal objective is to bring India into the Non-Proliferation Regime. What they want fits in well with the critical stand that Dr. Manmohan Singh took after Pokharan II in 1998. Both want India to come within the Non-Proliferation Regime dicated by the US.
The Manmohan Singh Government has deliberately and knowingly did not heed to the warnings and misled the people and the Parliament of India on this deal. It is now crystal clear that India will lose the right to nuclear tests forever as a result of this 123 Agreement. This agreement seriously jeopardise the great achievements of Sri Atal Bihari Vajpayee government’s nuclear deterrence. The entire world recognized India as a nuclear weapon state following the successful conduct of Pokhran II. In May 1998, the Atal Bihari Vajpayee led NDA government conducted multiple nuclear tests and declared its nuclear capability. India successfully detonated five ‘thermo-nuclear weapons.’ On Monday 11 May 1998, India declared itself a full fledged nuclear armed State.
Besides, India confidently countered several international sanctions. The entire nation firmly stood by the Vajpayee government. India courageously fought and withstood economic sanctions imposed by major countries in the world. When India refused to succumb, these countries have lifted the sanctions unilaterally. India repudiated discriminatory non-proliferation obligations.
The UPA government headed by a weak Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh has compromised on this great legacy and hypothecated India’s interests to foreign nations. 
LIES, LIES AND LIES
The irony is that Dr Manmohan Singh and his colleagues in the cabinet, Congress president Sonia Gandhi and her associates in the party, the allied parties of the UPA indulged in perjury and concocted illogical theories to defend the 123 agreement. The greatest misery is that the Prime Minister himself indulged in issuing false and misleading statements over the past three and a half year. He lied to the people of India and Parliament that Hyde Act is not binding on 123 Agreement and India is free to conduct nuclear tests in future.
Besides earlier statements, the Prime Minister’s office on July 2, 2008 said that ”the 123 Agreement clearly overrides the Hyde Act and this position would be clear to any one who goes through the provisions.” But, the letter sent by the Bush administration to Chairman of the House on Foreign Affairs Committee on January 16, 2008, completely exposes the Government of India and the fraudulent claims it has been making about the merits of the nuclear deal. The Bush administration clearly stated that the proposed 123 Agreement is in full conformity with the Hyde Act and in the event India detonated a nuclear explosive device then the USA has the right to cease all nuclear co-operations with India immediately including the supply of fuel as well as to request the return of any items transferred from USA including fresh fuel.
United States – India Peaceful Atomic Energy Co-operation Act – popularly known as –Hyde Act is an act adopted by US Congress providing exemptions to India with regard to nuclear science. This is a domestic Act of United States of America. This Act provides legal  basis for 123 Agreement with India. United States – India Peaceful Atomic Energy Co-operation Act of 2006 is the legal framework for a bilateral pact between US and India under which the US will provide access to civilian nuclear technology and access to nuclear fuel in exchange for IAEA safeguards on civilian Indian reactors. 
Mr Jeffrey T Bergner, Assistant Secretary, Legal Affairs of United States Department of state in a letter to Tom Lontos, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives categorically stated that — “In his September 19 Statement, Assistant Secretary Boucher twice made clear that we think (the proposed 123 Agreement with India) is in full confirmity with the Hyde Act. Indeed, the Administration is confident that the proposed agreement is consistent with the legal requirements of both the Hyde Act and Atomic Energy Act. The proposed agreement satisfies the particular requirements of Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act with the exception of the requirements for full-scope safeguards, which the President is expected to exempt prior to the submission of the agreement to Congress for its approval, as provided for in section 104 of the Hyde Act. The agreement is fully consistent with the legal requirements of the Hyde Act.”
Section 106 of the Hyde Act makes the US position clear: “A determination and any waiver under Section 104 shall cease to be effective if the President determines that India has detonated a nuclear device after the date of the enactment of this Act.
What does Section 104 say: “Pursuant to the obligations of the US under Article I of the NPT, nothing in this title constitutes authority to carry out any civilian nuclear cooperation between the United States and a country that is not a nuclear weapon state party to the NPT that would in any way assist, encourage or induce the country to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.
Further, Mr Bergner stated that — “the US government will not assist India in design, construction, or cooperation of sensitive nuclear techonologies through the transfer of dual-use items, whether under the Agreement or outside the Agreement. The United States rarely transfers dual-use items for sensitive nuclear activities to any cooperating party and no such transfers are currently pending.”
It is clear now that the deal will be terminated and all supplies will be stopped the moment India goes in for nuclear tests and all materials supplied to it will have to be returned.


Devaluing the Prime Minister’s office Dr Manmohan Singh approached the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in a deceitful manner without first seeking a vote of confidence in Parliament. The draft circulated to the IAEA board members has serious long-term implications for India.

The Prime Minister and the Congress president Sonia Gandhi prevaricated that the Agreement cannot be made public as it is a classified document. The Congress leaders could bluff with the people of India and allies of the UPA but the entire world found it on internet.

The draft Safeguards Agreement has made a mockery of the assurances that Prime Minister Dr.Manmohan Singh had repeatedly given to the nation. Speaking in the Lok Sabha on July 29, 2005, had said: “We shall undertake the same responsibilities and obligations as … the US”; “we expect the same rights and benefits” as the US; and “India will never accept discrimination”. This assurance has been flouted in the Agreement, which does not recognize India as a Nuclear Weapons State (NWS) on par with the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China.

The PM had assured that the Agreement would be “India-specific” – that is less onerous and intrusive than the Agreements with the Non-NWS. He had assured Parliament on August 17, 2006, that, “As a country with nuclear weapons, there is no question of India agreeing to a safeguards agreement or an Additional Protocol applicable to non-nuclear-weapons states of the NPT”.

Far from it being an India-specific agreement, the accord resembles IAEA agreements with non-nuclear-weapons states. With the exclusion of the first two pages that contain the preamble, and a couple of other exceptions, the text is largely modelled on IAEA safeguards agreements with non-nuclear-weapons state. As sought by the United States, the text of the India-IAEA accord has been drawn from the strengthened INFCIRC-66/Rev.2 (16 September 1968) model for NNWS.

India will have none of the rights that the five established nuclear-weapons states have vis-à-vis the IAEA. Nuclear-weapons states accept only voluntary, revocable inspections. Moreover, these five nuclear powers have the sovereign right to terminate their safeguards agreement with the IAEA.

The India-IAEA safeguards accord comes with perpetual, legally irrevocable obligations, which India cannot suspend or end, even if the supplier-states cut off supply of fuel and replacement parts. The IAEA inspections in India will not be nominal but stringent and invasive, of the type applicable to non-nuclear-weapons states.

The draft Agreement is exactly the same – word for word, para by para – as what the US Administration had wanted. India has not only accepted stringent “routine” inspections with “access at all times”, but also “Special Inspections”. Paragraph 63 of the India-IAEA accord states the “Agency may carry out special inspections if: (a) the study of a report indicates that such inspection is desirable; or (b) any unforeseen circumstance requires immediate action. The Board shall subsequently be informed of the reasons for and the results of each such inspection”.

In other words, the Agency will have the right to carry out “special inspections” if it believed any activity at a safeguarded Indian facility or any report raised questions. In the North Korean case, the board had approved the special inspections which the Pyongyang refused to allow. But India, in its accord with the IAEA, has consented to be subject to special inspections without the Board’s prior consent.

While the five established nuclear powers have offered only 11 facilities in total — less than 1% of their total facilities — for IAEA safeguards, India has agreed to place 35 of its facilities under IAEA inspection, according to the civil-military separation plan presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister in 2006.

These facilities include 14 power reactors; three heavy-water plants at Thal-Vaishet, Hazira and Tuticorin; six installations at the Nuclear Fuel Complex in Hyderabad; the PREFRE reprocessing plant at Tarapur; and nine research facilities, such as the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, Board of Radiation and Isotope Technology and Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics. In addition, the Prime Minister has agreed to shut down by 2010 the Cirus research reactor, which is one of the two research reactors in India producing weapons-grade plutonium. Several of these are generic facilities: nuclear medicine, irradiation of food grains, nuclear energy, and also nuclear weapons.

A source of grave concern for India is the fact that the so-called “Corrective Measures” in the draft Agreement, in the event of disruption of fuel supplies, are dangerously vague and non-specific. For example, the safeguards accord’s Clause 29 reads: “The termination of safeguards on items subject to this Agreement shall be implemented taking into account the provisions of GOV/1621 (20 August 1973)”. Although the text of the GOV/1621 document is not public, its central stipulation is well-known — that facility-specific safeguards shall be “in perpetuity”, allowing for no suspension of international safeguards and shutting out room for corrective measures. Such are the known conditions of GOV/1621 that the rights and obligations of the parties continue perpetually on all nuclear materials until the materials have been returned or all the fissionable material supplied, produced or processed goes out of the inventory.

Under Clause 32 of the India-IAEA accord, New Delhi can withdraw a facility from safeguards with the prior consent of the IAEA but only after “the facility is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards,” which means the installation’s nuclear capability has been dismantled or permanently disabled to the Agency’s satisfaction.

Another cause of concern is that in case of disagreement or dispute, there is no arbitration. India can only represent its case to the Board (Clauses 104 to 106), whose decision has to be implemented by us. If India does not act on its directive, the Board will report India’s non-compliance to the UN General Assembly and Security Council. Past experience has shown that India has rarely received justice when India-related disputes have gone to the UNSC.

The Prime Minister had assured Parliament on August 17, 2006, that, “As a country with nuclear weapons, there is no question of India agreeing to a safeguards agreement or an Additional Protocol applicable to non-nuclear-weapons states of the NPT”. In contrast, the “Additional Protocol” will seek to ensure that specialized equipment, trained personnel, and designs and operating manuals are not transferred from the civilian programme to the military programme. The Hyde Act demands that the “Additional Protocol” for India be “based on a Model Additional Protocol as set forth in IAEA information circular (INFCIRC) 540” — that is, the Protocol applicable to non-nuclear-weapons states.

The following are not provided at all: (a) Assured, uninterrupted fuel supply; (b) strategic reserves of fuel. In 123 Agreement, the promises for uninterrupted fuel supplies are all prospective. In August 2006, the PM had told Parliament, for instance, that: “An important assurance is the commitment of support for India’s right to build up strategic reserves of nuclear fuel over the lifetime of India’s reactors”. The Draft with IAEA carries no reference to the continuation of India’s safeguards obligations being contingent on perpetual fuel supply. The agreement indeed explicitly blocks India from ever undertaking real correction in response to a fuel supply cut-off — the lifting of  IAEA safeguards.

In fact, what was provided even in the 123 Agreement has been given the go-by. Article 5 of the 123 Agreement specified, “In the light of the above understandings with the United States, an India-specific safeguards agreement will be negotiated between India and the IAEA providing for safeguards against withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear material from civilian use at any time as well as providing for corrective measures that India may take to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies.”

Clause 3 of the IAEA draft Agreement provides: “The purpose of safeguards under this Agreement is to guard against the withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear material from civilian use at any time” Notice that the words are exactly as provided in the 123 Agreement. But the words that follow in the 123 Agreement are conspicuously missing! Similarly, no reference in operative parts to strategic reserves. Quite rightly too: it is no job of IAEA to help us build stocks of fuel – yet Government spokesmen are saying that the Agreement provides for these!

Lastly, the BJP has been demanding from the Government, right since July 2005, to know the cost of separation of military and civilian facilities. The Government has not given a reply to this important question till date.

While the Government has all along said that the deal is exclusively about nuclear energy, the US Administration and America’s bipartisan political class has left no one in doubt that the deal is all about bringing India into the non-proliferation regime.

The leadership of the Congress party and the Government  is assisting the US in realizing its most important foreign policy objective vis-à-vis India in a manner that has undermined India’s strategic autonomy while promising illusory energy security.

Disrespect for Parliament
Dr Manmohan Singh kept every thing secretive about the Nuclear Deal. He did not discuss the contents of this deal either in Parliament nor with his cabinet colleagues. There was total lack of transperancy. The irony is that the political parties and governments of the countries represented on the Board of Governors of the IAEA have an opportunity to debate the contents of the draft safeguards agreement concerning India, but the people and the political parties in India are deprived of that opportunity.
Dr. Manmohan Singh addressed a press conference in Washington on 20 July 2005, two days after he and US President George Bush issued a joint statement about the Indo-US nuclear deal. One correspondent asked Dr. Manmohan Singh a pointed question: “Mr. Prime Minister, do you see any resistance coming forward from your allies and the opposition in putting the new India-U.S. policy to practice? And will you seek a parliamentary consensus or approval to the new direction you seem to be taking in foreign policy?”
This is how the PM replied. “Well, the Parliament in our country is sovereign,” he said. “It goes without saying that we can move forward only on the basis of a broad national consensus.” If Dr. Manmohan Singh truly believes that “Parliament in our country is sovereign”, why did he not seek a sense of the two Houses before rushing into the 123 Agreement and the safeguards agreement with the IAEA? Not even one all-partmeeting was conducted on this issue. There was a consistent demand for setting up a Joint Parliamentary Committee to study the 123 Agreement. Dr Singh did not accept the demand. Probably the Prime Minister must have thought that the MP s are incapable of giving considered opinion on the issue.
Accountability and transparency are the cornerstones of democratic system of governance. These have been casualties in the functioning of the UPA government. This is best illustrated by the manner in which the government has handled the issue of the Indo-US nuclear deal. Ideally in a democracy, any major international agreement that impinges on India’s national unity, territorial integrity and security must be ratified by Parliament.The Prime Minister has reduced an important agreement between two sovereign nations into a private agreement between two individuals — himself and President Bush. He has behaved as a junior partner in this partnership.
                         (Authour is BJP national Media Co-Convener based in New Delhi)